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Abstract
Differences in regulated pharmaceutical prices within the European Economic Area create arbitrage
opportunities that pharmacy retailers can access through parallel imports. For prescription drugs under
patent, parallel trade affects the sharing of profits among an innovating pharmaceutical company, retailers,
and parallel traders. We develop a structural model of demand and supply in which retailers can choose
the set of goods to sell, thus foreclosing consumers’ access to less profitable drugs. This allows retailers
to bargain and obtain lower wholesale prices from the manufacturer and parallel trader. With detailed
transaction data from Norway, we identify a demand model with unobserved choice sets using retail-
side conditions for optimal assortment decisions of pharmacies. We find that retailer incentives play a
significant role in fostering parallel trade penetration and that banning parallel imports would benefit
manufacturers as well as prevent pharmacies from foreclosing the manufacturer’s product. Finally, in the
case of the statin market in Norway, we show that it would be possible to decrease spending and increase
profits of the original manufacturer through lump sum transfers associated with a lower reimbursement
price, thus decreasing price differentiation across countries. JEL codes: I11, L22
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1 Introduction
Many industries rely on a downstream retailing sector to market goods. Not only do vertical relationships
affect price competition among substitutes and differentiated goods, but retailers—as intermediaries between
manufacturers and consumers—can also affect competition by engaging in strategic actions affecting final
consumers’ demand. In context with price discrimination across markets, there is scope for parallel trade,
which affects the sharing of profits in vertical chains.
Within the European Economic Area, free movement of goods is a central force considered to increase
competition and bring consumer benefits. Pharmaceutical drugs are no exception, and trade across countries
is fully legal. However, drug pricing remains a national competence, and cross-country differences are sub-
stantial. As a result, there has been an increase in parallel trade, estimated at 5.5 billion euros in 2012, with
highly heterogeneous national market shares that can be up to 25% in some countries.12 Parallel trade of
pharmaceuticals is common in a handful of European countries, including important markets like Scandinavia,
Germany, and the Netherlands. Worldwide, it also affects other goods, such as cars, luxury goods and video
games. If parallel trade has a significant impact on sales, it may affect firms’ strategic incentives to launch or
develop new products.
In the case of medicines, cross-country price differences can be as large as 300%, driven by regulatory
caps or strict government rules for price setting. Differences in price regulation depend on the aggressiveness
of each member state’s authorities in negotiating with manufacturers (Kyle, 2007). Not surprisingly, these
price differences result in parallel imports of pharmaceuticals by high-price countries from low-price countries;
i.e., drugs are bought in Eastern or Southern European countries and resold in Northern European countries
(Kyle, 2011). Even though there is significant price dispersion across EU countries, Ganslandt and Maskus
(2004) report that parallel imports might have led to a reduction in drug prices on the order of 12–19% for
drug segments subject to parallel imports entry in Sweden. At the same time, there are large variations in
parallel import penetration across otherwise similar countries. These differences seem to have a clear link to
regulation governing margins at the pharmacy and domestic supply level (Kanavos et al. (2004) and Kanavos
and Vandoros (2010)).
As parallel traders need to enter through pharmaceutical retailers, retailers’ incentives are potentially
decisive in determining the extent of parallel trade due to retailers’ role as intermediaries in the supply chain.
The strategic role of profit-maximizing pharmacies, towards both drug manufacturers providing directly
imported drugs and parallel traders providing parallel imports, can thus be important in the organization of
1Firms specializing in parallel trade require necessary logistical capacity and facilities suitable for drug repackaging. Repack-
aging is required for drugs for which the imported package and accompanying information sheets is in a language other than
the language of the destination country.
2European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations 2008 report https://www.efpia.eu/media/361960/efpia-
pharmafigures2018_v07-hq.pdf.
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the pharmaceutical sector. Though essentially the same product, direct and parallel imports are potentially
differentiated by trade name, appearance, packaging and source of origin from the consumer point of view.
Differentiation in appearance and specification across countries has been linked to attempts to reduce the scope
for parallel trade (Kyle, 2009, 2011). Parallel imports create an alternative upstream supply for pharmacists,
which may have significant implications for the distribution of surplus in the market. In the case of prescription
drugs under patent, the monopoly rights of the manufacturer allow them to extract consumers’ willingness
to pay when setting prices either directly to the market or when negotiating prices with governments. Past
research has shown that innovation is indeed elastic to this reward (Acemoglu and Linn (2004), Dubois et al.
(2015)). However, if intermediaries such as pharmacies or parallel traders manage to extract a large share of
the monopoly rent of manufacturers, the innovation incentive may be inefficiently reduced. It is therefore
important to study how the organization of retailing and parallel trade affects profit sharing. While the
European market is smaller than that of the US, it can still have an effect (the US represents one-third of
total world pharmaceutical spending, while Europe is 22%), and our findings shed light on mechanisms that
must be known and taken into account for possible future policies on parallel trade in the US.
Contribution To study the sales of parallel-imported pharmaceutical drugs, we develop a structural model
of demand and supply with intermediaries (pharmacists and parallel traders). Specifically, we address the
question of how price differences across countries incentivize retail pharmacies to sell parallel imports. Our
model explains how parallel imports capture substantial market shares by retailers restricting the supply
of less profitable products to increase purchases of more profitable ones. This mechanism consists of the
pharmacy chain foreclosing access to direct imports. This foreclosure mechanism is different from the usual
anticompetitive practice of deterring a firm from a market as it results from the equilibrium bargaining
of wholesale prices by the manufacturer with Norwegian chains and could be avoided with lower wholesale
prices. However, the retailer must trade off foreclosing access to lower margin products and staying attractive
to consumers, as restrictions in their choice set might repel consumers with a preference for an unavailable
product. Indeed, although parallel and direct imports are the same drug, some consumers may prefer the
direct import variety due to aversion to products that have been traded and transported across intermediate
countries from their production site. Rare safety problems may explain this preference. Moreover, pharmacists
must inform patients when a drug is parallel imported, and packaging will usually display the name of the
parallel importer and differ in visual appearance. As consumers may be skeptical about parallel imports, we
consider the incentives of the retail side of the market to explain the penetration of parallel imports. We take
the reimbursement and regulatory price setting in Norway as given since this is determined in an initial stage,
usually following market authorization when the manufacturer enters. Given the reimbursement price set by
the Norwegian government, we model the retail pharmacist’s decision and negotiations of wholesale prices
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with the manufacturer and parallel traders, as well as price negotiations in other European countries from
which parallel traders eventually import. We model the wholesale price setting between pharmacy chains and
the manufacturer or the parallel traders as a simultaneous Nash-bargaining problem. However, we do not
model the dynamics of entry and exit across countries, and we do not try to explain the observed network of
parallel traders with pharmacy chains. In some of our counterfactuals, we model the effects of a reduction in
the reimbursement retail price taken as given in our estimation. We do so by taking into account the behavior
of the manufacturer, parallel traders, pharmacy chains in the Norwegian market and changes in wholesale
prices in source countries.
We use rich micro data on the Norwegian pharmaceutical market, where we observe detailed demand
data and pharmacy margins. In particular, we observe all purchases by individual consumers over time, the
pharmacy chain at which a given purchase happened, and whether the specific drug dispensed was imported
through the original manufacturer (direct import) or by parallel traders. We also observe pharmacy retail
prices for all transactions, in addition to wholesale prices paid by pharmacy chains to upstream firms for
each specific drug package. Thus, we observe the gross margin obtained by the chain on all products, which
affects retailers’ incentives to dispense parallel imports.
As the choice set of consumers potentially changes across pharmacies and is not observable to the
econometrician, we develop an estimation method based on observed transactions with unobserved choice
sets. To identify choice probabilities without observing choice sets, we nest the Nash equilibrium in pharmacies’
strategic choice sets in the probability of each observed choice. The demand model can be identified due to
exogenous variation in pharmacy margins for parallel and direct imports that lead to varying choice sets in
equilibrium. Our nested fixed-point algorithm could be applied to other settings in which retailer incentives
to propose varying assortments of products can be characterized by an equilibrium condition. We find that
inclusion of retailer incentives in our model plays an important role in explaining consumer choices. We
identify the bargaining weights of each party using the Nash-in-Nash equilibrium equations for wholesale
price determinations and exogenous price shocks in source countries together with exchange rate shocks that
affect the opportunity value of parallel imports versus direct imports. We then use the estimated bargaining
model to simulate three counterfactual situations related to i) the possibility for pharmacy chains to use
parallel imports, ii) their ability to use foreclosure strategies and iii) the level of the retail price cap imposed
by the government.
Our counterfactual simulations imply that even though, on average, consumers prefer directly imported
products, parallel imports allow retail pharmacy chains to capture a much larger share of industry profits
than would otherwise be the case, particularly at the expense of the manufacturer. In the atorvastatin market
(patented and marketed by Pfizer under trade name Lipitor during 2004-2007), the manufacturer’s profit
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would double (+104%) if there was no parallel trade, and pharmacy chains could lose all their profit as
manufacturers would be able to set wholesale price at the maximum retail reimbursement price. The shift in
profits to retailers is driven by two mechanisms: i) the creation of price competition between the upstream
firms from chains’ ability to shift sales as a response to differences in profitability, and ii) the outside option
a chain gains from the ability to sell parallel-imported drugs when bargaining over wholesale prices with
the direct importer. The counterfactual results show that a ban on parallel trade would thus substantially
increase the profit of the manufacturer in Norway at the cost of decreasing it slightly in the source country
we model (France), showing that the existence of parallel trade leads to higher prices and profit in France
than without. In the counterfactual case where closure is banned, the manufacturer gains and causes the
pharmacies’ profits to decrease, although not by a large amount. This result shows that the differentiation of
drugs and the possibility of pharmacy chains to purchase parallel imports at lower prices still allow them to
capture a large part of profits. Finally, we perform counterfactuals in which the retail price cap is lowered by
20%. The results demonstrate that most of the reduction is borne by pharmacy chains and parallel traders
because the margin of negotiation is considerably reduced by the lower difference between prices in source
countries and the maximum allowed retail price. The manufacturer loses very little profit, whereas the total
government expenses in this market are reduced by 20%. Thus, a lower reimbursement price in Norway would
reduce parallel trade, and despite decreasing the profit of the manufacturer both in Norway and in the source
country, it decreases the profit much less than what the Norwegian state would save in reimbursement, thus
allowing much lower prices that make both the manufacturer and taxpayers better off with a lump sum
transfer to compensate the lower price.
Related literature A small part of the literature on vertical relationships has addressed the role of strategic
actions such as choices regarding the assortment of goods (see Draganska et al. (2009) for an example). Typical
sectors in which retailers’ behavior have attracted attention from economists are Internet platforms and the
food retailing industry with large supermarket chains. Pharmacy retailing has been comparatively less studied,
although the growth in healthcare expenses among developed countries raises questions about how to design
policies to contain spending on pharmaceutical drugs while ensuring or improving patient access to innovation.
In Europe, most countries regulate prices of prescription drugs, although other aspects of competitive behavior,
such as strategic choice of entry across different markets, also matter substantially (Danzon and Chao, 2000;
Danzon et al., 2005; Maini and Pammolli, 2019). How pharmacists choose the assortment of drugs, proposing
parallel import, direct import or both, is similar to strategically choosing to stock out or foreclose access
to some versions of drugs. The previous literature has provided reduced-form evidence for this type of
response to markup differences in prescription drug markets. In a simpler setting in which physicians can
prescribe and dispense drugs, Izuka (2013) shows that Japanese physicians respond to markup differentials
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between originator and generics. In the Norwegian off-patent drug market, Brekke and Straume (2013) find a
strong relationship between market share and differences in pharmacy margins for branded and generic drugs.
Crawford et al. (2018) show similar foreclosure strategies in distribution of TV channels. Such a strategy can
also be profitable in other industries, though especially so in tightly regulated markets in which price setting
is constrained, as is common in many European countries for pharmaceuticals.3 Our demand estimation
with unobserved choice sets is also related to the literature regarding consideration sets or unobserved stock-
outs. In a seminal paper, Goeree (2008) uses advertising to identify the likely variation in consideration
sets using aggregate demand data. Crawford et al. (2017) use sufficient statistics on consideration sets to
estimate a discrete choice model with unobserved choice sets using individual-level transaction data. We
use the retail pharmacists’ incentives to manipulate choice sets to identify our demand model. In a different
context, Gaynor et al. (2016) estimate a demand model that explicitly captures choice constraints imposed
on patients by physicians. Our identification relies on the observation of individual choices and modeling
of pharmacists’ strategic choices. Conlon and Mortimer (2013) use the fact that they observe periodical
stock-outs of products in vending machines to estimate a demand model with varying choice sets. Our supply-
side vertical relationship model is related to the empirical IO literature using the Nash-in-Nash bargaining
equilibrium. Grennan (2013) uses a model of bargaining on prices of medical devices between hospitals and
upstream suppliers. Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) model bargaining between managed care organization and
hospitals in the US. Ho and Lee (2017, 2019) also use bargaining to model the negotiated provider prices.
Finally, some studies have addressed the impact of parallel trade on pharmaceuticals in Europe. Using a
structural model of demand estimated with data on the German market for oral antidiabetic drugs, Duso
et al. (2014) evaluate the welfare impact of parallel imports. Their estimates imply that parallel imports
have reduced the prices of on-patent drugs by 11% but that their impact on consumer surplus is modest.
The effect of parallel imports on drug prices therefore depends crucially on country specific regulation of
the pharmacies. In contrast to Duso et al. (2014), we explicitly model both the vertical relationship between
manufacturers and pharmacy retail chains, and the strategic role of retailer incentives in the development of
parallel import market shares. Using data from Norway, Brekke and Straume (2015) study the interaction
between price cap regulation and parallel imports across a large number of drugs. They find reduced-form
evidence that original manufacturers might benefit from lower price ceilings when there is competition from
parallel trade. Novel features of our paper include the strategic decisions by retailers regarding the drugs
offered to consumers, the structural estimation of the bargaining model and the analysis of counterfactual
policies and incentive configurations.
3For details about pharmaceutical market regulation in different countries, see, e.g., Kanavos et al. (2008).
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Structure of the paper In Section 2, we present the market and data. We present the structural model
of demand and supply in Section 3. In Section 4, we describe the empirical specification and identification of
our model and present the estimation results. In Section 5, we present the results from our counterfactual
simulations, while Section 6 concludes.
2 The Norwegian Pharmaceutical Market and Parallel Imports
2.1 Overview and Regulation
The supply side of the market for prescription drugs consists mainly of three large pharmacy retail chains,
which are vertically integrated with each of their upstream wholesalers. The three largest chains, Apotek 1,
Boots and Vitus, cover 85 % of all pharmacies, and public hospital pharmacies (6 %), a smaller retail chain
(5 %), and independent pharmacies (4 %) comprise the rest.
The Norwegian Medicines Agency is the main regulatory body for drug affairs, in charge of marketing
authorization, drug classification, vigilance, price regulation, reimbursement regulation, and providing infor-
mation about drugs to both prescribers and the public. With the exception of over-the-counter drugs, all
drugs sold on the Norwegian market are subject to a price cap set by the Norwegian Medicines Agency. As
a general rule, the price cap is set as the average of the three lowest retail prices of the same product in
a fixed group of European comparison countries, consisting of Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Germany, the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium and Ireland. This explains why there is usually scope
for parallel trade, as no countries in Eastern or Southern Europe, which usually have even cheaper prices,
are included. If drugs enter first in Norway, prices would be set in negotiation, with later revisions based on
comparisons after entry in other countries. Reconsideration of the price caps is initiated by the Norwegian
Medicines Agency, usually once per year. The price caps are set according to the active ingredient in the
drug and amount of active ingredient (dosage). Per unit price caps (with the unit defined by Defined Daily
Dose (DDD)) should generally be equal within the category of a given dosage for a given active ingredient.
In cases in which the patient has a long-term ailment, defined as requiring treatment for at least three
months, and the drug under question has been deemed to be sufficiently cost-effective, government reim-
bursement is available. The prescribing physician is responsible for deciding whether the patient satisfies the
criteria for treatment length, whereas the Norwegian Medicines Agency determines whether a drug satisfies
the cost-efficiency criteria for reimbursement. When patients are reimbursed, they face a copayment of 36
% of the total price, capped at 510 NOK in 2007 (≈ 50e) per three months. The copayments for drugs and
healthcare spending were capped at 1660 NOK yearly in 2007 (≈ 170e).
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2.2 Parallel Trade
Parallel traders must obtain a license from the Norwegian Medicines Agency to sell drugs in Norway, unless
they have already obtained a license for sales in the European Economic Area through the centralized
European Union procedure4. Parallel traders sell to one or more of the three vertically integrated wholesalers.
A license is given for a specific drug package imported from a specific country, with the exception of licenses
granted through the European Union procedure.
In our dataset, which contains information about prescription filings at pharmacies in Norway for the
period 2004–2007, we can identify whether each sold product is directly imported or parallel imported. Parallel
trade in Norway happens most prominently in the on-patent period and makes up a negligible share when
generics are present. The average share of DDD of parallel import in ATC codes (Anatomical Therapeutic
Chemical classification system) with generic entry is 3%, whereas it is roughly 27% among ATC codes without
generics.


















Notes: Graph of the 50 most important molecules featuring sales of parallel imports over the sample period. Monetary units in
nominal NOK ( ≈ 0.12e/ 0.16 $US in the period).
Figure 2.1 shows the parallel import share of sales within each pharmacy chain for the 50 most important
active ingredients for which parallel trade occurs. It is interesting to note the large variation both between
chains and over time. When analyzing the retail prices of parallel-imported and directly imported versions in
each chain, it appears that the price ceiling is binding for both categories for all active ingredients, dosages
and package sizes. Thus, there is no retail price difference between parallel- and directly imported versions
of the same molecule, and the price is equal to the price cap (i.e., the reimbursement price).
4see https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/files/eudralex/vol-1/com 2003_839/com_2003_839_en.pdf.
8




















Notes: Margin differences (margin of parallel import minus margin of direct import) in NOK per DDD. Differences calculated for
packages of the same ATC code, with same amount of active ingredient and of comparable size.
We also compare the margin that each pharmacy chain obtains. The pharmacy chain margin is defined
as the sales price in the pharmacy net of the price the pharmacy chain’s integrated wholesaler pays to the
supplier for obtaining the drug, where the supplier is either a marketing agency of the manufacturer, in the
case of direct imports, or the parallel trading firm. These margin differences shown in Figure 2.2 vary between
4% and 16% over the 4 years of data across the 3 chains.
The seeming correlation between margin differences and the parallel import share of sales in Figure 2.1 is
confirmed by a significant chain-month level positive correlation between parallel import shares and margin
difference between parallel and direct imports. This cannot be given a causal interpretation by itself, but it
is a first indication of pharmacy incentives mattering for the composition of drugs dispensed to consumers.
In the Norwegian market during this period, there were five companies specializing in parallel trade with
any noticeable activity, namely, Cross Pharma, Euromedica, Farmagon, Orifarm and Paranova. The share
of parallel import sales within each pharmacy chain for each of these companies displayed in Figure 2.3
shows variation both between pharmacies and over time in terms of the relative presence of these companies.
Considering the active ingredient level, each pharmacy chain works with one parallel importer at a given
time, although the identity of the parallel importer varies across chains for the same drug.
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Note: Share of parallel import sales DDD within a pharmacy chain for each parallel importer.
3 A Structural Model of Demand and the Supply Chain
We build a model that explains the behavior of consumers, pharmacy chains, parallel traders, and manufac-
turers while also determining the price setting in other countries that serve as source countries of parallel
imports in Norway.
Parallel trade occurs in the European Economic Area when patented drugs have entered in several countries.
It has been shown (Danzon et al. (2005), Maini and Pammolli (2019)) that once marketing authorization is
obtained, entry is typically sequential—from countries that accept high prices to countries that ask for lower
prices—rather than simultaneous. On average, delays between Western European countries and Eastern or
Southern European countries are about one to two years. We do not model this part of the game, as done by
Maini and Pammolli (2019), but only the price setting after drugs have entered in most countries. Delays in
launch decisions cannot be too long because patents have a limited duration and entry is much less valuable
after patent expiration where generic competition draws prices to lower levels. Due to high price caps, Norway
is typically among the first countries to experience entry of drugs. The retail price, denoted as p¯t in our model,
is the regulated price ceiling based on international comparison (see Section 2), which we take as given in our
model. This price is certainly lower than the theoretical monopoly price that would prevail otherwise on an
isolated Norwegian market because the manufacturer anticipates trade of drugs after their launch in other
countries. Given the retail price in Norway, we assume that the manufacturer negotiates wholesale prices
with Norwegian pharmacies as well as other countries. Simultaneously, parallel traders negotiate wholesale
prices with the pharmacy chains. Then, given the resulting prices and margins, pharmacies compete to attract
consumers. We thus start by modeling the consumer behavior given all wholesale prices and then model the
bargaining supply game that determines these prices.
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3.1 Consumer Behavior and Demand for Parallel-Traded Products
We assume that the consumer has an exogenous need for a drug with a particular active ingredient and
dosage. We abstract from therapeutic choice by prescribers, which, as we show in the online appendix 8.3, is
not significantly affected by the availability of parallel-traded versions of the drug or by pharmacy margin
differences and can thus be considered exogenous to the main mechanisms of our model.
The consumer chooses which pharmacy chain c to visit and—once in the pharmacy—makes a choice
among the available products in the pharmacy. When the consumer chooses a pharmacy c, he does not
know if parallel-imported (PI) or directly imported (DI) versions of the drug will be available, although we
assume that the consumer is aware of the expected availability. Because pharmacies potentially have higher
margins on drugs that the consumer does not strictly prefer, they face a trade-off between not proposing the
lower-margin drug to induce consumers to buy the other option and proposing consumers’ preferred drug
with a nonzero probability to attract them. This phenomenon is confirmed by casual observation, and the
fact that pharmacists do consider this policy of non-permanent availability is acknowledged in discussions
with them. We assume that consumers know the probabilities of availability chosen by the pharmacy chains.
Dubois and Sæthre (2018) present an alternative demand model in which consumers have heterogeneous
beliefs about the products available at each pharmacy chain and show that the results from our preferred
specification are robust to this alternative modeling of demand. Note that we also assume that consumers do
not search over multiple outlets because, unlike more differentiated products such as cars (Moraga-Gonzalez
et al., 2018), it seems unlikely in the case of a choice between PI and DI of the same branded prescription
drug without price differentiation. We also show in the online appendix 8.2 that consumers switch across
versions of the drug within a pharmacy chain more than they switch across chains for the same version of
the drug.
For a given active ingredient, the choice set at pharmacies can be {PI}, {DI} or B ≡ {DI, PI}. We let
the origin of the drug be indexed by k ∈ {0, 1} where 0 denotes PI and 1 denotes DI. We denote by θ0ct
and θ1ct the probabilities that the choice sets are {PI} or {DI}, respectively, and thus, 1 − θ0ct − θ1ct is the
probability that the choice set is B = {DI, PI}. We assume that the utility of consumer i is given by
uikct = Vikct + εict + λcikct
where Vikct is the mean utility consumer i obtains from choosing the drug of origin k in pharmacy chain c in
market t and εict and ikct are chain-specific and product-specific sequentially observed shocks, respectively.
We assume that they are distributed independently across drugs and chains according to a Gumbel distribution.
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However, our choice model is not a nested logit but rather a model with two extreme value distributed shocks
observed sequentially by the decision maker, where ikct is observed after choosing to purchase at chain c.
Thus, as ikct is i.i.d. extreme value distributed, the probability that consumer i chooses k ∈ {0, 1}




Then, the choice probability of product k conditional on the choice of pharmacy c is
sikt|c︸ ︷︷ ︸
choice probability of k
conditional on
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The consumer chooses a chain by taking expectations with respect to the possible choice sets and with respect
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which is always greater than max(Vi0ct, Vi1ct). Then, as εict is extreme value distributed independently across






which allows us to obtain the individual choice probability as sikct = sictsikt|c.
It should be noted that in equilibrium, patients will choose a pharmacy without knowing for sure which
drug will be proposed only when θ0ct + θ1ct is strictly between 0 and 1 but will know what version will not be
proposed when θ0ct = 0 or θ1ct = 0. A patient who has really strong taste differences in favor of k will put
more weight on choosing a pharmacy with θkct close to 1 so that she can obtain it with certainty.
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where F (.|β) denotes the c.d.f. of consumer preferences Vit ≡ (Vi01t, .., Vi0Ct, Vi11t, .., Vi1Ct) conditional on
the parameter vector β.
3.2 Pharmacy Chain Behavior
Let us now turn to the behavior of the pharmacy chains. The profits of chain c normalized by total market
size at time t are
pict =
∑
k∈{0,1} (pkct − wkct) skct,
where pkct is the retail price and wkct the wholesale price of drug k in pharmacy c at t. As retail prices
are regulated with a price ceiling that applies to both the direct and parallel import versions of a drug,
pharmacies can choose the set of products they prefer to sell but cannot have prices higher than the price
ceiling (pkct ≤ p¯t). However, since retail prices are always equal to the price ceiling (as for almost all on-patent
drugs), we treat the price ceiling chosen by the regulator as binding (pkct = p¯t). We show in online appendix
8.7 that it may be constrained-optimal for the pharmacy to set both prices of parallel and direct imports at
the price ceiling.
Pharmacy chains choose the optimal θ values after setting the wholesale prices with the manufacturer and
the parallel trader. We denote by mkct ≡ p¯t−wkct the product price-cost margin. We assume the existence of
a Nash equilibrium in θ values across the C pharmacy chains and use the conditions necessary for equilibrium.
We show in appendix 7.1 that it must be that θkct = 0 for the lowest-margin product. For simplicity, in
the following, we assume that in equilibrium after the bargaining stage, parallel imports (good 0) are the
high-margin product for all chains (which is the case in our data, as we will show later). Thus, we can set
the probability of proposing direct imports alone to zero θ1ct ≡ 0 in the following and define the probability
that both goods are available in pharmacy chain c as
θct ≡ 1− θ0ct,

















where δict is the incremental utility from having both drugs available as opposed to parallel import alone:















≤ 0 if θct = 0,
= 0 if 0 < θct < 1,
≥ 0 if θct = 1.
(3.2)
where θt ≡ (θ0t, · · · , θCt)′ is the vector of the probabilities that both goods are available and where the









ρictsict + θctρictδictsict(1− sict)
)
dF (Vit|β).
where ρict ≡ si1t|c,B is the probability that consumer i chooses the direct import variety in chain c when
both are available.5
From these expressions, we see that there are basically two effects of increasing the probability that both
products are available. To give a better sense of how the model works, we first discuss these effects from
the point of view of an individual i. The first effect is a change in the conditional choice probability of the
product—that is, the choice probability given that the individual has chosen pharmacy chain c—weighted
by the probability sict that chain c is chosen by individual i in the first place. This is negative for parallel
imports, as it reduces the number of times for which it is the only product available, whereas it is positive for
the direct import, as it increases the number of times for which it is part of the choice set. The second effect is
a change in the probability of choosing chain c, weighted by individual i’s conditional probability of choosing
the product. This effect is positive for both products since the incremental expected utility of having both
drugs available, δict, is positive for all individuals; i.e., more individuals will choose chain c when the variety
is greater. The aggregate effect then depends on the distribution of individual tastes in the population. As
an example, let us consider a decrease in θct to induce more consumers to buy the parallel-imported variety.
This will have a larger impact on the relative shares of the goods within pharmacy chain c when consumers
have a strong preference for the directly imported variety on average and even more so when this correlates
positively with the probability of choosing chain c in the population. However, if people on average have a
5Note that δict = −λc ln(1− ρict), which has the natural interpretation that individual i’s incremental utility from having
both goods available is increasing in the probability that she will choose the directly imported variety when both are available.
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strong preference for the directly imported variety, the incremental utility δict will tend to be large, thus
implying a stronger substitution away from chain c. This negative aggregate effect will be weaker if people
have strong preferences for a specific pharmacy such that sict tends to be either very high or very low and
also if there is a positive correlation between the taste for direct imports and chain c. From this, we can see
that the distribution of tastes in the population will be central in the decision of pharmacy chains on how to
foreclose the lower margin product.
The Nash equilibrium in each market t defines the vector θ∗t (w0t,w1t), with elements θ∗ct(w0t,w1t) that
are functions of the wholesale prices of direct and parallel imports in the market (w1t and w0t respectively)
and of the exogenously given retail price ceiling pt (omitted from the arguments for simplicity).
3.3 Upstream Manufacturer and Importers
We now turn to the modeling of the manufacturer supplying Norwegian pharmacy chains and other countries.
We assume that the manufacturer simultaneously negotiates the wholesale price in the source country and the
wholesale prices with pharmacy chains in Norway. Assuming that all prices satisfy a Nash equilibrium condition
of simultaneous bargaining between the manufacturer and each country purchaser, the Nash equilibrium
conditions determining the wholesale prices in Norway can be written with the wholesale prices in other
countries as given.





(w1ct − ct)s1ct(θ∗t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit to Manufacturer of Direct
Imports profit in chain c
+ (pI(c)1ct − ct)s0ct(θ∗t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit to Manufacturer of Parallel Import




(pI1t − ct)qIt(pI1t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
other countries profits
where ct is the marginal cost of production, pI(c)1ct is the manufacturer’s wholesale price in the source country
I(c) for the units sold by the parallel importer supplying chain c from country I(c), pI1t is the wholesale price
determining demand in the source country I, qIt(pI1t) is the demand for domestic consumption in source
country I, and w1ct is the wholesale price charged for the directly imported drug to chain c at time t. Even
though pI(c)1t is the main determinant of p
I(c)
1ct , we allow the possibility that they differ due to transaction
costs and wholesale margins.
We assume simultaneous Nash bargaining among the manufacturer, the parallel importers and the chains
as well as between the manufacturer and the other countries and characterize the equilibrium.
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[(w1c˜t − ct)s1c˜t + (pI(c˜)1c˜t − ct)s0c˜t]−
∑
c˜




(w1c˜t∆1cs1c˜t + pI(c˜)1c˜t ∆1cs0c˜t),
because the manufacturer profit in other countries
∑
I(pI1t − ct)qIt(pI1t) is unchanged whether or not the
manufacturer agrees with pharmacy chain c in Norway. Concerning parallel traders exporting drugs to Norway,
their Nash profit surplus when bargaining with Norwegian pharmacy retailing chains also does not depend on
other possible trade activities in other countries. Finally, the Nash profit surplus of Norwegian pharmacists
also depends only on Norwegian profits.
This shows that we do not need to account for equilibrium conditions in other countries when considering
the equilibrium in the Norwegian market and can take the wholesale prices in source countries as given. We
therefore present the equilibrium conditions for the Norwegian market alone and later discuss how we need
to account for equilibrium effects of different counterfactual policies both in Norway and in other countries.
We assume that upstream firms and pharmacy chains bargain over wholesale prices, leading to the Nash-
in-Nash bargaining model (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). As documented by Brekke and Straume (2015), the
prohibition against side payments in contracts between manufacturers and wholesalers in the Norwegian
pharmaceutical market explains why only linear pricing transactions are observed.
When describing equilibrium price conditions, we take as given the transactions of parallel traders. The
choice of a parallel trader to work with a pharmacy chain varies with variations in the opportunity costs of
drugs for parallel traders. The fact that the identity of the parallel trader company may change over time
for a given pharmacy will not affect the wholesale price equilibrium, provided that the negotiation with the
pharmacy chain is a bilateral negotiation that does not use threat of replacements like in Ho and Lee (2019)
(explaining the network of parallel traders with pharmacy chains is left for future research).
3.3.1 Manufacturer Behavior
The total sales of the manufacturer of a drug in a given market (country) come from two channels: the direct
import channel of its product (good 1) to all chains c and the parallel imports of the same patented active
ingredient (good 0) by all chains c. Here, we hypothesize a fully rational manufacturer, internalizing the sales
in a given market induced by parallel trade with other countries.
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(w1ct − ct)s1ct(θ∗t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit to Manufacturer of Direct
Imports profit in chain c
+ (pI(c)1ct − ct)s0ct(θ∗t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit to Manufacturer of Parallel Import
in chain c at wholesale source price pI(c)1ct
where ct is the marginal cost of production assumed to be identical across countries, pI(c)1ct is the manufacturer
price in the source country of the parallel importer supply chain c, and, as before, w1ct is the wholesale prices
charged for directly imported drugs to chain c at time t. In the online appendix 8.13, we describe the full
bargaining model where we do not assume that it is always the same θkct that is at the zero corner solution
for the different vectors of wholesale prices considered in bargaining. For simplicity of exposition, we propose
here the bargaining game where we assume the relevant zone of negotiation is such that the pharmacy chains
will never find it optimal to propose parallel imports only.
We assume that in each pairwise negotiation with the pharmacy chains, the manufacturer and chain c
set wholesale prices to maximize the Nash product
(Πt −Π−c,t)b1c(pict − pi−1,ct)1−b1c (3.3)
where b1c is the bargaining weight of the manufacturer when negotiating with chain c, Π−c,t is the manufac-
turer’s profit in the absence of an agreement with chain c, and pi−1,ct is likewise chain c’s profit in absence of
an agreement with the manufacturer.
We assume that in the case of disagreement between the manufacturer and chain c, the chain still sells
parallel imports. It is true that if the wholesale price of the manufacturer is low enough, it may not be
profitable for parallel traders to enter, in which case the pharmacy chain has no other supply channel. We
write equilibrium conditions that are valid in the range of wholesale prices where parallel trade is still
valuable. Thus, the Nash surplus of the pharmacy chain agreeing with the manufacturer can be written as
the difference between the profit when the chain sells both direct and parallel imports and the profit when
it sells only parallel imports at the agreed wholesale price in equilibrium (because of the Nash assumption).
We assume that each bargaining manufacturer-chain pair takes as given the equilibrium wholesale prices
of parallel imports in each pharmacy chain w0t = (w01t, w02t, · · · , w0Ct). This corresponds to a Nash-in-
Nash equilibrium (Horn and Wolinsky, 1988) which is commonplace in the literature estimating structural
bargaining models (see e.g., Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012), Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) and Ho and Lee
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(2017)). The first-order condition for a solution to equation (8.7) is
b1c
∂Πt/∂w1ct
Πt −Π−c,t + (1− b1c)
∂pict/∂w1ct
pict − pi−1,ct = 0. (3.4)
In maximizing the Nash product, there will be an effect on the manufacturer’s profit due to how changes in
wholesale prices affect the equilibrium θ∗t (w0t,w1t) in the next stage of the game.
Note that in the case where the manufacturer has all the bargaining power, that is, b1c = 1, equation (3.4)
reduces to the first-order condition for an optimal take-it-or-leave-it contract on w1ct for the manufacturer,
whereas in the case of b1c = 0, it can be rewritten as the condition for an optimal contract proposed by the
chain.
The derivative of the manufacturer’s profits with respect to the wholesale price is
∂Πt(w1t,θ∗t (w0t,w1t))
∂w1ct





















+ ∂s0c˜t∂w1ct ) = 0), and
the derivative of chain c’s profits with respect to the wholesale price w1ct is
∂pict (w0ct, w1ct,θ∗t (w0t,w1t))
∂w1ct
= −s1ct (θ∗t ) + (p¯t − w1ct)
∂s1ct (θ∗t (w0t,w1t))
∂w1ct




In the two expressions above, the derivatives of market shares with respect to wholesale prices will depend
on the derivatives of market shares with respect to θ and the derivatives of equilibrium θ values with respect
to wholesale prices (detailed formulas are in Appendix 8.4).
By denoting the net value of agreement for the manufacturer and chain c respectively as ∆cΠt ≡ Πt−Π−c,t
and ∆1pict ≡ pict − pi−1,ct and using vector notations for market shares s0t = (s01t, .., s0Ct) and s1t =
(s11t, .., s1Ct), we can then rewrite equation (3.4) governing the solution to the bargaining between the


















The expression in parentheses on the right-hand side is the (negative of) loss in profits to chain c from a
change in the direct import wholesale price, which depends on the reduction in direct import sale from the
change in equilibrium θ∗t , in addition to the gain in parallel import sale. The larger the relative bargaining
power of the chain, 1−b1cb1c , is and the larger the net value of agreement for the manufacturer relative to that
of the chain, ∆cΠt/∆1pict, is, the larger the weight given to the (change in) profits of the pharmacy chain
when determining the wholesale price.
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By letting sjc˜t\1c denote the share of chain c˜’s product j in t when direct imports are not available at




[(w1c˜t − ct)s1c˜t + (pI(c˜)1t − ct)s0c˜t]−
∑
c˜





w1c˜t∆1cs1c˜t + pI(c˜)1t ∆1cs0c˜t
)
,
because sjct\1c = 0, and defining ∆1csjc˜t ≡ sjc˜t − sjc˜t\1c the difference in share of product j in chain c˜
between the case of agreement and disagreement in the negotiations between the manufacturer and chain c.
Similarly, the net value for the chain c is
∆1pict = (p¯t − w1ct)s1ct + (p¯t − w0ct)∆1cs0ct,
Once the demand shape is identified, together with the optimal behavior of pharmacy chains, the system
(3.5) has one equation per molecule-pharmacy chain-period, with in principle one unknown parameter b1c.
The system also depends on the wholesale price of drugs earned by the manufacturer in the foreign country
p
I(c)
1ct . If p
I(c)
1ct is known, the system of equations (3.5) allows us to identify the bargaining weight of each
pharmacy chain.
3.3.2 Parallel Importer Behavior
The full Nash-in-Nash solution is obtained when we also consider the conditions for bargaining between the
parallel importer and each of the pharmacy chains.




(w0ct − pI(c)0ct )s0ct(θ∗t ),
where w0ct is the wholesale price paid for parallel-imported drugs by chain c and pI(c)0ct is the price that
the importer has to pay for the drug in the source country, which we allow to vary across chains c for full
generality because each chain may use different source countries.
We assume that the parallel importer bargains over the wholesale price with each pharmacy chain c,
where they take as given the negotiated wholesale prices of the originator product to each pharmacy chain
w1t = (w11t, w12t, · · · , w1Ct). Similar to equation (3.4), the first-order conditions for the solution to the Nash




+ (1− b0c) ∂pict/∂w0ct
pict − pi−0,ct = 0, (3.6)
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where the left-hand side is the derivative of parallel importer profits with respect to w0ct and where





∆0pict = pict − pi−0,ct = (p¯t − w1ct)∆0cs1ct + (p¯t − w0ct)s0ct
and ∆0cs1ct corresponds to the change in market share of the direct imports at chain c with and without
parallel imports at chain c.
Then, one can use these optimality conditions to identify the parallel importer’s bargaining parameters




4 Data, Identification and Empirical Results
4.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We estimate our model on the Norwegian market for atorvastatin, which is a member of the statin drug
class used to lower blood cholesterol. It is marketed by Pfizer under the trade name Lipitor. The patent
expired towards the end of 2011, and the drug was thus under patent for the whole period from 2004 to
2007 covered by our data. The drug comes in four distinct strengths in the Norwegian market: tablets with
10, 20, 40 and 80 milligrams of the active ingredient. The prescription determines which of these strengths
the consumer can obtain at the pharmacy, and the pharmacy can freely propose the directly imported or
parallel-imported alternatives. Atorvastatin was used by roughly 140,000 individuals in 2004 and 2005, but
the number of users dropped to approximately 100,000 in 2006 and 85,000 in 2007.6 This change is due
to a change in the recommendation of statin prescriptions in June 2005, which required simvastatin to be
prescribed for all new cases requiring statin treatment and required present users to be put on simvastatin
treatment within a year, unless medical considerations dictated otherwise.7 The motivation for the regulation
was to reduce expenditure for the Norwegian National Insurance Administration because the reimbursement
price of simvastatin was lower.
6The population of Norway was roughly 4.6 million in this period.
7More details about this regulatory change can be found in Sakshaug et al. (2007).
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We use data on atorvastatin for our structural model estimation while including other prescription drugs
under patent for reduced-form evidence. We combine data from several sources: transaction data from the
Norwegian Directorate of Health covering all purchases of reimbursable drugs by individuals in Norway;
wholesale registry data from the Norwegian Institute of Public Health containing monthly wholesale prices of
drug wholesalers in Norway; data regarding price regulation, substitutability and parallel marketing licenses
from the Norwegian Medicines Agency; and data about aggregate wholesale prices in several countries from
IMS Health (now called IQVIA). We thus have data concerning all purchases of atorvastatin in Norway
for the period 2004–2007, which amounts to approximately 1.4 million transactions. The transactions were
performed by approximately 170,000 individuals, where a pseudo-ID for each individual allows us to track
individual choices over time. For each transaction, we know the price charged for the drug by the pharmacy
chain, the copayment paid, the specific pharmacy at which the transaction happened, the number of packages
bought, and the specific drug package. The normal treatment for high cholesterol is one tablet per day, and
the strength depends on the initial cholesterol rate and type. Given this normal rate of administration, chronic
treatment with Lipitor is enough to reach the binding maximum copayment per quarter. Given that most
chronic users of Lipitor also consume other drugs, all of them usually reach the maximum copayment for
medical drugs, meaning they are marginally fully reimbursed.
Table 4.1: Market size (DDD), share of parallel imports, consumers and wholesale prices
2004 2005 2006 2007
40 mg
Defined Daily Doses (millions DDD) 23.78 31.22 26.42 29.32
Share parallel import 0.79 0.48 0.07 0.17
Consumer Price (pt) 4.16 4.21 3.82 3.90
Direct import wholesale price 3.00 3.01 2.71 2.76
Parallel import wholesale price 2.91 2.93 2.87 2.03
80 mg
Defined Daily Doses (millions DDD) 12.03 20.12 27.38 35.69
Share parallel import 0.93 0.86 0.96 0.63
Consumer Price (pt) 2.15 2.23 1.98 1.97
Direct import wholesale price 1.55 1.60 1.40 1.39
Parallel import wholesale price 1.52 1.50 1.38 1.35
Note: Prices in in NOK/DDD.
Table 4.1 shows the yearly size of the atorvastatin market in Norway in millions of defined daily doses
(DDD), segmented by the amount of active ingredient.8 We also calculated the parallel import share of
DDD within each segment. For 40 and 80 mg, parallel imports often cover a substantial share of the market,
constituting approximately 90% of the 80 mg segment in the period 2004-2006.9 The reason for the differences
8Our definition of the market includes direct purchases in pharmacies by individuals exclusively. Although there might be
some usage of atorvastatin in hospitals—for instance, as part of statin treatment after heart attacks—the numbers in our data
are virtually identical to official statistics regarding drug utilization in Norway for aggregate usage of atorvastatin, which leads
us to conclude that this usage represents a negligible share of sales.
9Parallel imports only entered in 2007 with very small market shares for the 10 and 20 mg dosage forms.
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in parallel import shares is likely a combination of differences in parallel export opportunities, differences in
profitability across parallel import locations and differences in the relative price in the source country and
Norway. The online appendix 8.11 shows evidence across all products without the presence of a generic on
the correlation between parallel import entry and the source countries wholesale prices in NOK that vary
with exchange rate shocks. We use our model to explain the parallel imports market shares for markets in
which they are present, which are the ones that we use in our estimation regarding upstream manufacturer
and importer behavior.
The price to consumers reflects the regulatory price ceiling set by the Norwegian Medicines Agency, as all
packages—both parallel and direct imports—are consistently priced at the price ceiling. From the wholesale
prices, we see that the aggregate margin is larger for parallel imports in all cases (the exception for 40 mg
in 2006 is due to the average being taken over the full year for direct imports but only for part of the year
for parallel imports because the reduction in the price ceiling early that year allowed parallel importers to
withdraw10 from the market (see Figure 4.1)).
Pfizer holds the patent and is responsible for the direct imports, whereas Farmagon and Orifarm are
parallel importers. The parallel importers have licenses to import from the United Kingdom, France, Czech
Republic and Poland. Parallel-imported drugs are repackaged by the parallel importer to be in accordance
with specific national guidelines on package labels, language and warnings.
Figure 4.1 shows monthly sales of parallel imports and the manufacturer (Pfizer) in thousands of DDD
for each segment and pharmacy chain. These graphs show the important variation over time, products and
chains of the parallel import or direct import sales.
Figure 4.2 shows the percentage margin difference between parallel and direct imports separately for each
segment and pharmacy chain. As the consumer price is always equal to the price cap for both the directly
and parallel-imported varieties, the retail pharmacist margin difference between parallel and direct imports
is exactly equal to the wholesale prices difference of parallel and direct imports. Margins of parallel imports
are consistently higher than direct imports because wholesale prices are consistently lower than the direct
import wholesale price.
Figure 4.1 shows that the sales of the 40 mg version of parallel imports are more important than sales
of direct imports and that the former grew over time during 2004 across the three chains. However, they
decreased strongly after that period for chains 1 and 2, as the margin advantage of parallel imports decreased
simultaneously in 2005 for both chains, as seen in Figure 4.2. For chain 3, the parallel import sales decreased
earlier in the second part of 2004, when their margins decreased relative to those of direct imports, but during
10In 2007, there were again some parallel imports for the 40 mg market but only in one chain, not the three, as was generally
the case for 2004-2006 for the 40 mg period and for the full period for the 80 mg. Our model is still valid when not all chains
use parallel imports, but we did not include this market and period in our sample period of estimation. Including 2007 data for
the 40 mg market in our estimation sample is unlikely to change the results of the bargaining parameters estimates significantly.
22























































































 . Y P  . Y P  . Y P  . Y P
 ' L E M R        Q K
2005, unlike in those in chains 1 and 2, parallel import sales in chain 3 increased again and exhibited at the
same time a growing margin compared to direct imports. For the 80 mg version, parallel imports dominated
sales over direct imports, except at the end of 2007 for chain 2 and temporarily for chain 1. These figures
show that sales of Lipitor vary significantly over time between parallel and direct imports.
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4.2 Reduced-Form Evidence
To further investigate the descriptive evidence of correlation between pharmacy margins and sales of different
versions of the same drug, we perform a set of reduced-form regressions showing that sales of parallel imports
do react to the pharmaceutical chain margins. We do so for all prescription drugs under patent for which
there is substantial parallel imports over the period 2004-2007 as well as for Lipitor only, which is the product
market for which we estimate our structural model. As skjct stands for the market share of drug j version k
in pharmacy chain c at month t (where
∑
c∈{1,.,C},k∈{0,1} skjct = 1), we regress the log relative within-chain
share of direct imports (ln(s1jct/(s0jct + s1jct))) on the margin of the pharmacy chain for each version k.
Table 4.2 below shows that the margins of parallel imports and direct imports of the pharmacy chain
affect the relative sales of each version within the chain in a way suggesting that pharmacy chains manage
to steer sale towards the most profitable version of the drug.
Table 4.2: Reduced form evidence of relationship between parallel imports and pharmacy margins
All prescription drugs Lipitor Only





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct imports margin m1jct 0.013 0.052 1.863 2.433
(0.043) (0.014) (0.574) (0.602)
Parallel imports margin m0jct -0.058 -0.035 -0.244 -0.572
(0.013) (0.009) (0.070) (0.119)
Chain-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
ATC5 fixed effects Yes Yes No No
N 3,333 3,333 574 574
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered at the molecule level in columns (1) and (2) and at market level in columns (3)
and (4).
The regressions in columns (1) and (2) are for all prescription drugs under patent for which there is
substantial parallel imports and (3) and (4) are for Lipitor only. In the case of Lipitor only, drug class
(ATC5) fixed effects are useless as the regression is done on one product only. These regressions show that
the larger the parallel import margin is and the lower the direct import margin is, the larger the sales of
parallel imports versus direct imports. As patients’ unobserved preferences for one version over the other
could change over time (for example because of demographics) and be observed by the pharmacy chain,
wholesale price negotiations could lead to margins correlated with these unobserved preferences. We therefore
instrument margins in a two-stage least squares regression in columns (2) and (4) using as instruments the
average quarterly wholesale prices of the drug in Czech rep., France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the UK,
in addition to the NOK exchange rates with US dollar, Euro, UK pound, Czech koruna, and Swiss Franc.
Costa-Font (2016) finds a similar effect using data from the Netherlands by regressing the market share of
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parallel imports of statins on price differences in source countries and other distance variables, showing that
they are driven by cross-country differences in margins. We thus have clear evidence that strategic behavior
of pharmacies allows them to sell more of the drugs for which they have a higher margin. The trade-off
mechanism exhibited in our model is consistent with these findings, predicting that pharmacies will sell even
more of the high-margin version of the drug when the margin difference increases.
Similarly, Brekke and Straume (2013) show that in the case of off-patent drugs, the share of generics
versus the originator brand are related to pharmacy-chain margins even controlling for (consumer) price
differences. This shows that pharmacies manage to steer patients to choose the higher margin product when
substitution is possible.
Moreover, we also show that pharmacy chains’ margins and profits increase with the entry of parallel
imports. Table 7.1 in appendix 7.3 shows a positive correlation between the presence of parallel imports for
a given product, chain and time period, and the total profit or average margin across the DI and PI versions
of the drug in chain c at period t. Instrumenting the presence of PI for a given product with the wholesale
price in source countries and exchange rates, the two stage least squares regressions show a strong positive
and significant effect. This shows that pharmacy chains can use parallel import to increase profit.
4.3 Econometric Identification and Estimation
Our structural model of demand and supply can be estimated using data regarding consumer choices between
parallel trade and directly imported versions of a drug and data about the pharmacy retail chain margins or
wholesale prices. We first show how to estimate the discrete choice model developed in Section 3.1, in which
consumers choose between pharmacy chains and direct versus parallel-imported drugs. Our random utility
model resembles a classic random coefficients discrete choice model, although with the difference that random
utilities depend on pharmacies’ unobserved strategic choices on assortment of parallel trade versus direct
imported drugs. To address this issue, we simultaneously estimate preference parameters and the assortment
set probabilities of pharmacy chains using the profit maximization conditions explained in section 3.2 in
the likelihood function as shown below. In a second step, we use the estimated parameters to identify the
bargaining parameters using the vertical chain bargaining model developed in section 3.3.
4.3.1 Demand Identification with Consumer and Pharmacy Chain Behaviors
From the discrete choice demand model described in section 3.1, the individual choice probability for consumer
i choosing version j ∈ {0, 1} at pharmacy chain c and period t is given by















. We specify individual i’s utility from product version j bought at
pharmacy chain c in market t as
Vijct = αjct + νijct
where αjct is the average utility in market t for product j at chain c, common to all individuals, and νijct is the
individual deviation from the mean utility for that good, capturing heterogeneity in consumers’ tastes. Just as
there is typically significant heterogeneity in preferences for generics related to education (Bronnenberg et al.,
2015), a similar source of unobserved heterogeneity is possible for parallel imports. In our setting, unobserved
heterogeneity in the consumers’ distances to stores, for example, could be important, as could other chain-
specific variation in preferences. Since the common mean effects αjct vary freely across version-chain-market,
they can capture unobserved market effects for each product in addition to chain effects.
We allow a flexible distribution of preferences modeling νijct as a mixture of normal distributions as:





Drug version specific taste
+ δgic + σgic νci︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pharmacy specific taste
(4.2)
where νki is individual i’s taste characteristics for characteristic k, which is either the product version j or a
specific chain c; gi ∈ G denotes the latent group of i; and G is the set of groups in the population. We assume
that νki obeys a standard normal distribution in the population with δ
gi
k as the mean deviation in taste for k
for individuals in this group and σgik as the standard deviation of this individual heterogeneity. After some
initial estimates and tests with a growing number of latent classes, we allow four latent classes, where one is
arbitrarily chosen as the base group, g = 0 with δ0j = δ0c = 0.11 Each group g has a population share τg to be






c , λ1, .., λC , τ1, .., τG) the full vector of parameters
governing heterogeneous preferences.
Then, the likelihood of individual i’s choice sequence is given by








where Pi is the set of purchase events of consumer i, j(p) and c(p) denote consumer i’s choice of product and
chain under purchase event p, and t(p) is the market in which purchase event p happens. Thus, sij(p)c(p)t(p)(νi)
is individual i’s choice probability conditional on his unobserved heterogeneity νi ≡ (νji , νci ) and F (νi|β) is
the cumulative distribution function of νi.
As the parameters θct are unobserved, we use the pharmacy chains’ Nash equilibrium to solve for them
within the likelihood calculation which gives us a nested fixed-point algorithm as follows:
11This normalization is necessary for identification since the αjct average utility parameters will pin down the baseline mean
utility of version and chain across the unobserved groups.
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Inner loop for given preference parameters β: We first find the mean preference parameters αjct and
the choice set parameters θct that satisfy the conditions necessary for Nash equilibrium across pharmacy chains
and the equality condition between observed and simulated market shares given the vector of parameters β.
For a given vector (θt,β), we know from Berry (1994) and Berry et al. (1995) that one can solve for all
α0ct, α1ct such that for all j, c:
sˆjct = sjct(θt, α0ct, α1ct,β) (4.4)









we can uniquely define α0ct(θt,β), α1ct(θt,β) that are continuous in all θct. Then, for any α0ct, α1ct we assume
that there exists a Nash equilibrium in θt across the chains so that we can define θct(α0t,α1t,β) ∈ [0, 1] that
solves for all c:
θ∗ct = arg max
0≤θct≤1
pict(m0ct,m1ct,θ∗−ct, θct, α0ct, α1ct,β) (4.5)
with pict(m0ct,m1ct,θt, α0ct, α1ct,β) ≡ m0cts0ct(θt, α0ct, α1ct,β) +m1cts1ct(θt, α0ct, α1ct,β).12
For each pharmacy chain c, the profit function pict is continuous in all θct, the best response of each chain
is well defined, and we only require best response functions to cross. We will assume this is the case, which can
be verified empirically. θct(α0t,α1t,β) ∈ [0, 1] are continuous in all α0ct, α1ct because pict(θt, α0ct, α1ct,β) is
continuous in all θct that belong to [0,1]. Then, assuming that the image of [0, 1]C by θt(α0t(.,β),α1t(.,β),β)
is [0, 1]C , we can use Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem and obtain that there is a vector θt that is solution of
θt(α0t(θt,β),α1t(θt,β),β) = θt
This proves that there is a vector (α0t(sˆt,m0t,m1t,β),α1t(sˆt,m0t,m1t,β),θt(sˆt,m0t,m1t,β)) solution of
(4.4) and (4.5). At this step, we can search for the possibility of multiple solutions over the support of θ,
which has the advantage of being bounded below and above.13
Outer loop maximizing the likelihood in β: We then maximize in β the likelihood function
Li(β; sˆt,m0t,m1t) = Li(β;α0t(sˆt,m0t,m1t,β),α1t(sˆt,m0t,m1t,β),θt(sˆt,m0t,m1t,β)) (4.6)
12We do not need to assume unicity, and we numerically search for possible multiple equilibria.
13We provide details about our numerical procedure corresponding to the inner loop algorithm in the online appendix 8.6.
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The estimation routine is a nested fixed-point algorithm, where we solve for the parameters α0t(β), α1t(β)
and θt(β) conditional on the current value of β in the inner loop, while searching for the parameter vector
β that maximizes the log likelihood in the outer loop.
These optimal choices of θct mean that they can be expressed as functions of the vector of margins or
wholesale prices, θ∗ct(m0t,m1t) or θ∗ct(w0t,w1t), in addition to being functions of the mean utility parameters
αjct and the vector β. The identification of the demand model is given by the properties of the likelihood (4.3)
but does not want to rely on its functional form with the assumption that margins (m0t,m1t) (or equivalently
wholesale prices (w0t,w1t)) vary independently of preferences (α0t,α1t). We could allow the heterogeneity of
preferences (4.2) to be time-varying provided that we also assume that the variability of margins (m0t,m1t)
is independent of the varying heterogeneity of preferences. We do not do so for simplicity and because of the
already large time flexibility introduced by the mean preferences (α0t,α1t). Then, observing individual choice
variation across choice occasions gives us considerable identifying power with respect to mean preferences
α0t, α1t, as individuals have time-invariant heterogeneity of preferences.
Even if there are many parameters since we have (α0ct, α1ct, θct) for each chain-market combination, by
utilizing the fact that these parameters are common across consumers within each chain-market, they can be
solved for by a simpler root-finding algorithm, conditional on the parameter vector β. The intuition is that
within each market t, these parameters can be set such that observed market shares are equal to predicted
aggregate shares and such that the conditions for chain profit maximization hold.
Finally, we note that the corner solutions of θct(β) = 1 allow some independent variation of the likelihood
in parameters β not coming from the changes in θct driven by β when θct is interior. This intuitively allows
us to separately identify the effect of preferences from the effect of choice sets. Intuitively, θct will be equal
to one when the margins for each version of the drug are sufficiently similar given the region of preference
parameters β, and the individual choices will vary only because of preferences.
4.3.2 Identifying Bargaining in the Supply-Side Model
We now use the vertical structure competition game developed in section 3.3 to identify the supply-side
parameters of the model. The objective is to identify all the bargaining parameters b0c and b1c respectively
for the parallel importer and the manufacturer negotiation with each pharmacy chain c.
The optimality conditions (3.5) and (3.7) of the bargaining game between the manufacturer or the parallel
importer and pharmacy chains relate demand and bargaining parameters to the source country opportunity





can be different because of the costs related to packaging and extra logistics when importing from source
countries and the pricing between the manufacturer, the source-country wholesaler and the parallel importer.
28








) and the source countries’ wholesale prices








) are functions of observables Xt, such as the wholesale prices in
the source countries, company-fixed effects for the manufacturer or parallel importer, and interactions with
source country prices14. With pI0t and pI1t from the optimal bargaining equations (3.4) and (3.6), stacked in
the vector pIt = (pI0t,pI1t) for each market t, we specify
pIt (b) = Xtη + t,
where b is the vector of bargaining parameters b = (b01, · · · , b0C , b11, · · · , b1C).
Then, we assume that we observe instrumental variables Zt such that E[t|Zt] = 0 and identify the
parameter vector (η,b) using the moment condition E[(η,b)|Z] = 0. Our instrumental variables Zt include
exchange rate shocks between NOK and the US dollar and Euro, in addition to the price ceiling p¯t, indicators
for pharmacy chain identity, and interactions. We use the sample analogs of moment conditions E [Z ′(η,b)] =
0, with a weighting matrix W such that our GMM estimator is
(ηˆ, bˆ) = arg min
η,b
(η,b)′ZWZ ′(η,b). (4.7)
The intuition for identifying the bargaining parameters in light of the instrument set is that pharmacy
chain identity should be informative about the overall bargaining strength of the chain while being plausibly
uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of costs related to parallel trade. We thus preclude the possibility
that sorting of parallel importers across pharmacy chains is related to the costs of parallel trade.15 In addition,
the price ceiling affects sales revenues for a given product, with a potentially differential impact on the total
net value of agreement in the different pharmacy chains due to differences in the response of demand and
other chains’ strategies (θct) in the event of a disagreement. Thus, the interactions between pharmacy chain
indicators and the price ceiling can help identify the bargaining parameters because the equilibrium effect of
changes in net values of agreement depends on the bargaining parameters. The necessary assumption for the
price ceiling to be valid instruments is that it is uncorrelated with t, conditional on the wholesale prices in
other countries included in Xt16.
14We use not only the wholesale prices in the source countries France and the UK but also those in Germany, Italy, Spain,
Turkey, France, the UK and the US, which will be informative about the price at which parallel traders acquire the drugs and
what the manufacturer earns on parallel trade.
15The costs here are interpretable as both the total costs of parallel traders, e.g., procurement and handling, sales value in
the source country and differences in import costs between Norway and the source country.
16It is possible that the price ceiling—as a function of prices in several other countries, as described in Section 2.1—is
correlated with the unobserved determinants of parallel trade costs. The UK is the only source country in our sample that is
also in the reference countries for regulatory price ceilings but robustness checks shows that not using UK prices gives similar
results .
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4.4 Estimation Results of the Structural Model
As our data contain a very large amount of choices, we draw a random sample of 50,000 individuals from the
full sample for estimating the individual choice model. We also restrict our attention to the markets for the
40 and 80 mg versions, as parallel imports only entered late in our period of analysis for the 10 and 20 mg
strengths, so we do not have sufficient data for a careful estimation.
Demand Estimates The maximum simulated likelihood estimates of the demand model are presented
in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Table 4.3 presents the preference parameters except all the mean parameters αjct.
The mean utility preferences of baseline group (g = 0) are normalized to zero. The statistical and economic
significance of parameters governing preferences of unobserved discrete groups shows that the finite mixture
of normal specification of preferences is better than a simple random coefficient distribution of preference.
Moreover, it shows a pattern in which each group has a stronger relative preference for each of the pharmacy
chains, which can be interpreted by the many unobserved factors—such as travel distance or chain-store
preference—that would matter in consumers choices. All λc parameters are in the (0,1) interval as should
be the case. With our estimates, we can simulate the average probability that an individual would choose
direct imports versus parallel imports if free to choose. Figure 4.3 presents the distribution of this probability
across markets (dosage-months), clearly showing the average preferences of consumers for direct imports.
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Choice Probabilty of DI versus PI
Note: Probability to choose direct versus parallel imports if free to choose across the three chains and predicted from demand
parameters estimates and averaged across latent groups.
Table 4.4 presents the distribution of the estimates of the chain-market specific choice set probabilities
θ. These estimates show that θ varies across markets and chains and are on average between 0.58 and 0.82
for the 40 mg market and between 0.39 and 0.67 for the 80 mg one. The estimates also show that there are
many corner solutions for which θ is equal to one, meaning that both parallel imports and direct imports are
always proposed by that chain in a given market (dosage-month combination). The median and 25% and
75% quantiles show that for some years, more than half of market-chains have θct = 1. Looking at chains’
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Table 4.3: Parameter estimates for consumer choice model with supply constraints
Latent groups g = 0 g = 1 g = 2 g = 3
τg 0.07 0.26 0.29 0.38
– (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)





δg0 0.00 0.53 −0.35 −0.39
– (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
σg0 0.22 0.02 0.98 0.81
(0.13) (0.83) (0.01) (0.02)
Chain specific taste (δgc + σgcνci )
δg2 0.00 4.09 1.94 −4.30
– (0.03) (0.05) (0.11)
δg3 0.00 −0.97 6.46 −3.80
– (0.12) (0.07) (0.10)
σg2 3.01 6.50 7.96 2.67
(0.13) (0.23) (0.10) (0.13)
σg3 2.75 3.27 3.59 2.52
(0.16) (0.13) (0.07) (0.13)




Note: one observation is a choice sequence of transactions by an individual. Standard errors in parentheses. The drug version
specific taste is for parallel imports, and the reference is for direct imports. All α0ct, α1ct jointly estimated are not shown, whereas
θ0ct, θ1ct are presented in Table 4.4.
behavior, chain 1 performs significant foreclosure of direct imports in 2004, whereas chain 2 never does, and
chain 3 does moderately for the market for the 40 mg dosage. In 2005, the picture is similar for the 40 mg
market, with a bit less foreclosure of direct imports by chain 1, but on the 80 mg market, chains 2 and 3
start engaging in some foreclosure. In 2006, chain 2 starts performing foreclosure on the 40 mg market but
still does not do so on the 80 mg market. Chain 1 continues quite substantial foreclosure in 2006 and 2007,
whereas chain 3 does less in 2006 but a bit more in 2007. The fact that the chains have different strategies in
θct can be explained by the fact that they have different margins and possibly different tastes by consumers
(αkct) which are unrestricted and can depend on geographic location of stores (for example). In the case of
40 mg dosage, chain 1 indeed has wholesale margins for parallel imports, which are on average 0.39 NOK
higher than for direct imports while for chain 2 it is 0.21 NOK and for chain 3 it is 0.16 NOK. For the 80 mg
dosage, chain 1 indeed has wholesale margins for parallel imports that are on average 0.06 NOK higher than
for direct imports while for chain 2 it is 0.04 NOK and for chain 3 it is 0.06 NOK. There is variation over
time, but these averages are consistent with the fact that chains have different strategies. Of course, margins
are endogenously determined, and our model also allows us to rationalize the margins determination with
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bargaining over wholesale price with the parallel traders and the manufacturer. The equilibrium margins
depend on consumers’ preferences (αkct), the bargaining parameters and the shocks in source countries’
wholesale prices. We also report the mean across chains and markets of the estimated standard errors of θct,
which show that they are precisely estimated.
Table 4.4: Foreclosure parameter estimates θct
Strength 40mg 80mg
Chain Year 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2006 2007
1 Mean 0.008 0.522 0.404 0.037 0.041 0.016 0.358
25% percentile 0.006 0.081 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.005
Median 0.007 0.632 0.012 0.020 0.010 0.011 0.106
75% percentile 0.010 0.880 1.000 0.035 0.020 0.024 0.858
Mean std. err. (0.180) (0.346) (0.105) (0.263) (0.055) (0.148) (0.203)
2 Mean 1.000 1.000 0.437 1.000 0.839 1.000 1.000
25% percentile 1.000 1.000 0.018 1.000 0.979 1.000 1.000
Median 1.000 1.000 0.152 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
75% percentile 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Mean std. err. (0.234) (0.052) (0.182) (0.111) (0.143) (0.041) (0.042)
3 Mean 0.756 0.962 1.000 1.000 0.302 0.847 0.502
25% percentile 0.438 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.035 1.000 0.208
Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.055 1.000 0.308
75% percentile 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.414 1.000 1.000
Mean std. err. (0.062) (0.147) (0.052) (0.347) (0.155) (0.310) (0.333)
All Mean 0.588 0.828 0.613 0.679 0.394 0.621 0.62
chains 25% percentile 0.010 0.835 0.015 0.042 0.016 0.029 0.20
Median 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.064 1.000 1.00
75% percentile 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.00
Mean std. err. (0.159) (0.182) (0.113) (0.240) (0.118) (0.166) (0.193)
Note: The last row of each panel estimates lists the mean across markets of estimated standard errors of θct. The standard errors
of each θct are obtained using their censored normal asymptotic distributions, as described in Appendix 8.5.
Bargaining Model Estimates The estimates of the bargaining parameters in Table 4.5 follow the method
presented in Section 4.3.2, using the demand model estimates of Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Note that the constraint
that bargaining parameters should be between 0 and 1 is not imposed in our estimation. The GMM estimates
of equation (4.7) are obtained using the Lipitor wholesale price in the UK and the Czech Republic converted
to NOK per DDD, both interacted with an indicator for parallel imports as explanatory variables Xt, and
instruments Zt that (in addition) include excluded variables such as indicators for chain identity and upstream
firm type (parallel trader versus manufacturer), exchange rates NOK/$US, NOK/e, NOK/CZK, interactions
of exchange rates with indicators for parallel trade and the inclusive value of the upstream firm interacted
with upstream firm type. The inclusive value of upstream firm is the (average) log-sum of exponential utility
for each upstream firm in the market. This instrument is derived from the demand model, and measures of
how “valuable” the firm’s presence is to consumers in the market. Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) use this type of
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instrument, namely, a “predicted willingness-to-pay for the hospital” when estimating the bargaining weights
between hospitals and Managed Care Organizations in the US. In our case, these inclusive values measure the
willingness of customers to pay for parallel imports or direct imports; they are estimated using the consumer
choice model and can explain why the manufacturer or parallel importer may be able to negotiate better
wholesale prices with the pharmacy chain, thus serving to identify bargaining weights.
Table 4.5: Bargaining parameter estimates (GMM)
Manufacturer Parallel Importer
b1c b0c
Pharmacy Chain 1 0.95 0.50
(0.02) (0.38)
Pharmacy Chain 2 0.55 0.26
(0.12) (0.41)
Pharmacy Chain 3 0.67 0.32
(0.14) (0.36)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimates of GMM equation (4.7), where Xt includes UK and Czech Republic Lipitor whole-
sale price interacted with indicator for parallel imports and excluded instruments in Zt are exchange rates NOK/$US, NOK/e,
NOK/CZK interacted with indicator for parallel trade and the inclusive value of the upstream supplier interacted with upstream
supplier type (DI or PI).
From these estimates, we can see that (perhaps unsurprisingly) the parallel importers on average wield
a smaller bargaining weight than the manufacturer. Pharmacy retailers, which are concentrated in Norway,
constitute an important gatekeeper for parallel trade companies that want to export to Norway. Among
the three pharmaceutical retailing chains, chain 2 is the international company Boots that retails drugs
in a few other European countries such as the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, but is absent in France and
other southern Europe countries that are typically source countries for parallel trade. It is thus unlikely that
international retail pharmacists like Boots can influence parallel trade bargaining because of their presence in
source countries. However, the fact that Boots also resells Pfizer products in the UK in addition to Norway
can have some effect in their bargaining power with respect to the manufacturer. Taking this as given may
explain why chain 2 (Boots) has the higher bargaining parameter with respect to the manufacturer while it
does not have the highest market share in Norway.
We also use the Nash-bargaining equation (7.4) shown in appendix 7.2 for one of the main source countries
(France) to identify the marginal cost of production ct. Indeed, since aggregate demand (adding PI and DI)
is constant in Norway, the cost of production is immaterial to the change in manufacturer profit in Norway
and the marginal cost ct is indeed absent from the Norwegian Nash-in-Nash equilibrium conditions. Details
on demand estimates in France, which is an important source country for Lipitor in Norway, are provided in
the online appendix 8.10.
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5 Counterfactual Simulations
Using our estimated model, we study several counterfactual policies. The first counterfactual of interest
investigates the effect of parallel trade on firms’ profits and consumer welfare by comparing the current
situation with the counterfactual equilibrium where parallel trade is absent. Then, we consider a hypothetical
regulation of pharmacies that would remove their possibility to foreclose the choice of direct imports to
consumers. Finally, we implement a counterfactual in which we also decrease the retail price of Lipitor by
20%. In the last two counterfactuals, we take into account non-negative profit conditions for parallel traders,
allowing exit but not entry as this is unlikely to happen given that we model counterfactuals where parallel
traders are in general worse off. Both a ban on direct import foreclosure and a retail price decrease in Norway
tend to reduce parallel trade. Entry of new parallel traders would be more likely if we were modeling the
effects of a price increase in Norway or a policy change which would reduce the price in one of the source
countries.
5.1 The Impact of Parallel Trade
We simulate a counterfactual situation in which parallel imports are banned, and direct imports therefore
capture all demand. As observed retail prices are equal to the regulated price ceilings even when parallel
imports are present, retail prices will necessarily be equal to the regulated price ceilings when only direct
imports are allowed. Then, consumers will simply choose their preferred pharmacy chain. In such a case, the







which is equal to the market share of chain c in the absence of parallel imports. Once the counterfactual
demand is known, we determine the counterfactual wholesale prices to compute profits. When parallel
importers are absent, a pharmacy chain gets zero profits in case of disagreement with the manufacturer. In
case of agreement, chain profits only depend on direct imports with pictnoPI = (p¯t − w1ct)s1ctnoPI . For the
manufacturer, profits are given by ΠtnoPI (w1t) =
∑
c(w1ct − ct)s1ctnoPI .
Without parallel imports, if the manufacturer disagrees with a chain, consumers only options are direct
imports sold by other chains. If all consumers still purchase the drug, the manufacturer will still obtain margins
on all units demanded. The manufacturer has an incentive to set all wholesale prices equal to the retail price
ceiling w1ct = p¯t because there is no loss from disagreeing with any chain, i.e., ΠtnoPI −Π−c,tnoPI = 0. In this
case, the full market revenue is captured by the manufacturer, with pharmacy chains obtaining zero profits,
as if there was vertical integration.
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However, this main scenario can be thought of as an upper bound on what the manufacturer can obtain.
If demand for direct imports in a chain is lost in the case of disagreement with the chain, then the Nash
bargaining between the manufacturer and any chain c leads to the simple wholesale price
w1ctnoPI = b1cp¯t + (1− b1c)ct. (5.2)
Though this scenario is unlikely, it provides a lower bound on the counterfactual profit of the manufacturer.
Table 5.1: Impact of removing parallel imports of Atorvastatin
Integration Bargaining
w1ct = p¯t w1ct= b1cp¯t+(1− b1c)ct
∆q0 ∆q1 ∆pi ∆w1 ∆pi
Pharmacy Chain 1 −12.56 14.68 −13.75 0.35 −5.51
−100% 435% −100% 17% −40%
Pharmacy Chain 2 −5.11 4.05 −7.86 0.21 −2.89
−100% 100% −100% 10% −37%
Pharmacy Chain 3 −6.32 5.25 −7.58 0.26 −3.19
−100% 217% −100% 13% −42%
∆Π ∆Π
Manufacturer 23.99 28.56 0.27 10.94
243% 104% 13% 40%
Parallel −23.99 −1.13 −1.13
−100% −100% −100%
Manufacturer on French market −2.72 −2.72
−1.36% −1.36%
Other statins profit on French market −5.04 −5.04
−1.31% −1.31%
Note: Quantities are in millions of DDD per year. Prices are in NOK, and profits are in millions of NOK per year.
Table 5.1 presents the counterfactual changes in quantities (∆q), wholesale prices of direct imports (∆w1)
and profits (∆pi and ∆Π) from the observed equilibrium to the counterfactual case without parallel trade.
The demand changes when parallel imports are banned are identified using (5.1).
Removing parallel imports implies that aggregate demand switches to direct imports and is redistributed
across the three chains so that chain 1 sells more Lipitor than before the ban while chains 2 and 3 sell
less as there is less substitution towards direct imports than the initial parallel imports sold within these
chains (the aggregate quantity sold by each chain, ∆q1 + ∆q0, being positive only for chain 1). The change
in profits would favor the upstream manufacturer and penalize pharmacy chains. Pharmacy chains cannot
use intra-brand competition between parallel and direct imports to extract part of manufacturers profits.
The total profit of the manufacturer would increase by 28.56 million NOK per year if the manufacturer set
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wholesale price to the maximum reimbursement price and to a minimum of 10.94 NOK per year if the retailer
keep some bargaining power. The parallel trader would disappear (losing their 1.13 million yearly profit) and
pharmacy chains would lose significantly. Chain 1 loses much more than the others because they must accept
a much higher increaes in wholesale price. The differences across chains are due to the fact that they do not
use the same amount of parallel imports and thus, when banning parallel imports, the effect is more or less
strong. Chain 1 had considerably stronger incentives to foreclose direct imports, leading to both higher share
of parallel imports and lower bargained wholesale prices, such that the increase in the wholesale price of DI
with a ban on PI is larger.
Table 5.1 also shows the change in profit for the manufacturer and for other statin producers in the source
country France. Solving for the bargaining outcome between the manufacturer and French regulator, we
find that price would decrease leading to a reduction in profit of 2.72 million NOK per year, or less than
2% of the estimated profit on the French market. Other statins producers would lose approximately twice
this amount due to tougher competition from Lipitor. This is small compared to the gain in Norway. The
fact that the price decreases shows that the existence of parallel trade puts upward pressure on prices in
France. The counterfactual outcome in France absent parallel trade does not depend on the wholesale prices
in Norway, and is therefore the same when Norwegian wholesale prices are high—equal to the maximum
retail reimbursement price—or low.
This counterfactual shows that banning parallel imports would benefit the manufacturer and substantially
reduce the profit of retail chains. We report details on consumer welfare effects in online appendix 8.12.
Although many consumers gain because they prefer direct imports, effects are mixed since there is also a
negative effect from variety loss. However, we do not consider consumer welfare effects as very important
given the problem at hand where both products offer truly similar medical benefits.
5.2 The Impact of Direct Imports Foreclosure by Pharmacy Chains
We now consider a policy which, e.g., through regulation, would prevent pharmacies from foreclosing access
to directly imported versions of drugs to consumers. Under such a policy, parallel imports are allowed and
used by pharmacy chains, but pharmacies are not allowed to exclusively offer parallel imports to consumers.
Inspection of pharmacies’ offerings to consumers would easily allow such a regulation to be implemented. Our
estimates show that among the chain-market combinations featuring parallel imports, the estimated θ varies
significantly between zero and one but is less than one for 45% of chain-markets, meaning that the consumer
will face a restricted choice set in those instances. The quantitative effect of setting θ equal to one on the
pharmacy chain demand will depend on the preferences of consumers. Moreover, when the pharmacy chains
are required to always offer both varieties, it will also have an effect on the bargained wholesale prices between
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the upstream firms and the pharmacy chains. This implies that wholesale prices will generally increase, since
there is no longer an incentive for the upstream firms to reduce wholesale prices to increase sales.
To simulate the counterfactual, we use the bargaining model of Section 3.3 with the estimated bargaining
parameters, where counterfactual demand is obtained by requiring pharmacies to set θct = 1. When foreclosure
is prevented, consumers can always choose between direct and parallel imports, and the pharmacist cannot
affect demand. Therefore, the market share of each version and chain is exogenously given by preferences.
To be more precise, when foreclosure is prevented, the counterfactual individual choice probabilities sikct are
given by sikct = sictsikt|c, where the choice probability sikt|c of version k of the drug conditional on pharmacy
chain c is as before, but not the chain choice probability. The expected consumer utility of visiting pharmacy c
is Eikct
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)λc˜ eVikct/λceVi0ct/λc + eVi1ct/λc . (5.3)
Aggregate demand is obtained by integrating over the estimated distribution of preferences of consumers.
We then solve for the bargaining outcomes between the manufacturer or parallel importer and the pharmacy
chains by taking into account bargaining in the source country France (details are provided in the online
appendix 8.9).
Table 5.2 shows the counterfactual results. First, preventing foreclosure of direct imports would raise total
direct import sales by 9.27 million DDD per year (reducing sales of parallel imports by the same amount). The
largest part of this substitution would occur at chain 1. Then, as wholesale prices increase, the three pharmacy
chains lose profits, with losses from 6% at chain 2 to 11% at chain 1. We see that the manufacturer would
gain from such a change, with an overall increase of revenue of 0.97 millions NOK per year. This increase
occurs because there is no longer an element of competition for the upstream firm when bargaining over
wholesale prices with the chains, such that the manufacturer wins both because of an increase in wholesale
price of direct imports and substitution from parallel imports to direct imports. Pharmacy chains would lose
more than the manufacturer earns because parallel importers would also slightly gain with this policy. This
experiment shows that it would reduce the part of profits obtained by pharmacy chains at the expense of
the original manufacturer, in addition to shifting some profits from pharmacy chains to the parallel traders.
Finally, the profit of the manufacturer and other statin producers in the source country France would barely
change as indicated in Table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Impact of preventing parallel imports foreclosure (θct = 1) of Atorvastatin
∆q0 ∆q1 ∆w0 ∆w1 ∆pi
Pharmacy Chain 1 −8.01 8.75 0.09 0.09 −1.49
−64% 259% 5% 4% −11%
Pharmacy Chain 2 0.06 −0.45 0.01 0.02 −0.50
1% −11% 0% 1% −6%
Pharmacy Chain 3 −1.32 0.97 0.02 0.01 −0.63
−21% 40% 1% 1% −8%
∆Π
Manufacturer 9.26 0.04 0.97
94% 2% 4%
Parallel −9.26 0.04 0.50
−39% 2% 44%
Manufacturer on French market 0.03
0.02%
Other statins profit on French market 0.08
0.02%
Note: Quantities are in millions of DDD per year. Prices are in NOK, and profits are in millions of NOK per year.
5.3 Decrease in the Price Ceiling
We now consider a reduction of retail prices p¯t by 20% under the assumption that foreclosure is also absent.17
In this counterfactual, as new wholesale prices may decrease substantially and parallel importers profits
decrease, it is likely that participation constraints requiring positive profits may bind for parallel importers,
leading them to exit from some markets.
Table 5.3 shows that the 20% reimbursement price reduction that decreases total drug expenses by the
government by 20% has a much lower effect on the manufacturer than pharmacy chains. The 20% retail
price decrease leads to a wholesale price decrease of direct imports of only 1% in chain 1, 9% in chain 2
and 4% in chain 3. The sales of direct imports increase substantially in chain 1, while total profits of the
manufacturer decrease by 7% or an average of 2.03 million NOK per year. At the same time, total expenses
decrease by 19.47 million NOK per year (20% of the total expenses in these markets). This shows that if the
manufacturer ex ante negotiates the retail price ceiling p¯t for reimbursement with the Norwegian government,
it could accept a 20% lower retail price with a lump sum transfer above 2.03 millions NOK per year from the
government that would make both the manufacturer and the government (tax payers) better off. Moreover,
the lower reimbursement price of Lipitor in Norway leads to a reduction in the price of Lipitor in the source
country (France) of only 0.25% on average and a profit decrease of 0.16 million NOK (0.08% of the profit
on the French market) for the manufacturer and a decrease of 0.26 million NOK per year for all other statin
17Preventing foreclosure in the counterfactuals where the retail price ceiling is lower simplifies simulations, although allowing
pharmacists to use a foreclosure strategy does not change the results in any important ways.
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Table 5.3: Impact of reducing the price ceiling by 20% for Atorvastatin
∆q0 ∆q1 ∆w0 ∆w1 ∆pi
Pharmacy Chain 1 −7.93 8.78 −0.04 −0.02 −9.50
−63% 260% −2% −1% −69%
Pharmacy Chain 2 −0.27 −0.21 −0.46 −0.18 −3.70
−5% −5% −23% −9% −47%
Pharmacy Chain 3 −1.47 1.09 −0.17 −0.08 −4.68
−23% 45% −8% −4% −62%
∆Π
Manufacturer 9.67 −0.09 −2.03
98% −5% −7%
Parallel −9.67 −0.22 −0.44
−40% −11% −39%
Manufacturer on French market −0.16
−0.08%
Other statins profit on French market −0.26
−0.07%
Note: quantities are in millions of DDD per year. Prices are in NOK, and profits are in millions of NOK per year.
producers in France. Other statin prices in France are also reduced, but only by roughly one tenth of the
price reduction of Lipitor in France.
Robustness checks Dubois and Sæthre (2018) show the results when the reaction in France is not taken
into account. In that case, parallel imports would decrease slightly more (in chain 1 and almost same in
others) at the benefit of direct imports, and the manufacturer’s profits would decrease by 1.92 million instead
of 2.03 million. It shows that taking into account the price reaction in source countries when the Norwegian
government sets a lower reimbursement price matters somewhat whem evaluating the loss to the manufacturer.
With other retail price reduction amounts, the effects are qualitatively similar. With a 10% retail price
reduction, for example, the effect on the manufacturer profit is even smaller, while most of the reduction in
expenses is attributed to a reduction in pharmacy chain profits. Table 5.4 shows the changes in profits for
different retail price reductions from 10 to 30%. As mentioned earlier, when performing these counterfactuals,
we must also check that the price reduction still allows parallel importers to remain in the market. When the
retail price is too small, some parallel importers will exit the market because their source cost corresponding
to some wholesale price in a source country is too high compared to the maximum price allowed in Norway.
In the case of a 20% price reduction, there are approximately 10% of chains-month combinations (20 cases)
where the parallel importer exits. Of course, when some parallel trader stops working with a chain in a given
market, it both reduces competition between chains and (marginally) benefits the manufacturer.
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Table 5.4: Impact of reducing the price ceiling of Atosvastatin (and preventing parallel imports foreclosure)
∆pt −10% −15% −20% −25% −30%
∆pit
Pharmacy Chain 1 −5.38 −7.33 −9.50 −11.41 −13.22
−39% −53% −69% −83% −96%
Pharmacy Chain 2 −2.64 −3.35 −3.70 −4.32 −5.00
−34% −43% −47% −55% −64%
Pharmacy Chain 3 −2.70 −3.73 −4.67 −5.60 −6.48
−36% −49% −62% −74% −85%
∆Π
Manufacturer −0.19 −1.06 −2.04 −2.95 −4.15
−1% −4% −7% −11% −15%
Parallel 0.01 −0.21 −0.44 −0.65 −0.85
1% −19% −39% −58% −75%
Number of chain-market exits 2 8 20 32 43
Government spending change (∆ (ptqt)) −9.73 −14.60 −19.47 −24.33 −29.20
∆ (ptqt)−∆Π −9.55 −13.54 −17.42 −21.38 −25.05
Manufacturer on French market −0.01 −0.08 −0.16 −0.18 −0.26
Other statins profit on French market −0.02 −0.10 −0.26 −0.32 −0.50
Notes: The profits changes are in millions of NOK per year. Percentage are indicated below absolute changes. There are 77 markets
(strength-month combinations) and thus 231 chain-market observations.
6 Conclusion
By investigating the incentives of pharmacy chains in selling parallel-traded drugs, we show that foreclosure
of directly imported drugs is plausibly used by pharmacy chains to increase profits and bargaining position
relative to the manufacturer. Pharmacy chains procure parallel imports at lower prices than direct imports
and attempt to steer demand towards the parallel-imported versions of drugs. With retail prices constrained
by regulation, pharmacy chains effectively introduce competition between upstream suppliers by distorting
assortment. In our counterfactual simulations, we find that a lower retail price may not be very detrimental to
the manufacturer, as it can reduce the presence of parallel imports, thus reducing opportunities for pharmacies
to extract rents by using parallel imports.
The specific random foreclosure mechanism that we highlight—in which pharmacies can distort avail-
ability of drugs for which they have differing margins—has not been formalized in the previous literature,
although pharmacists’ incentives have been mentioned as a plausible factor impacting sales of drugs for
which substitution at the pharmacy level is available (see, e.g., Caves et al., 1991). The incentives to distort
availability seem particularly important in many European countries, where price regulation is prevalent.
Furthermore, we show how to identify and estimate the consumer demand model with choice sets unob-
served to the econometrician by modeling retailer incentives to choose the optimal set of product varieties.
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In our case, this is achieved by using rich data regarding retail pharmacies’ margins, in a setting where the
retailer has clear incentives to partially foreclose access to less profitable products, even though it might
reduce the retailer’s attractiveness to consumers. The method can be useful for many other settings where
strategic supply-side choice of product offerings can be modeled and taken into account when estimating
demand.
We estimate our structural model for the atorvastatin market, showing that the original manufacturer
could be better off accepting a lower reimbursement price combined with a lump sum transfer from the
government when marketing in Norway. This transfer would be much less expensive than the additional
reimbursement that the government spends under the higher observed prices. This finding shows that lower
price discrimination across countries can make both the tax payer and private patent holder better off if
accompanied by lump sum compensation to the original manufacturer who owns the patent. However, we
do not model the optimal reimbursement price setting by the Norwegian government, which should take
into account not only the consequences on international price setting given the possibility of parallel trade,
but also the existence of substitute drugs on the market. Moreover, we also do not account for quantity
constraints. Quantity shortages are unlikely to happen for an important statin product such as atorvastatin,
and the European competition law prevents restriction of quantities for trade. However, European competition
authorities started becoming less strict on this point, as they understood the problem of parallel imports,
such that quantity restrictions on imports may become important in the future.
Our results also show that we should consider vertical relationships and market structure of pharmacy
retailing in the debate on impact of parallel trade on long-term welfare. In fact, parallel trade can be considered
a threat to third-degree price discrimination, which could result in a manufacturer only serving high-demand
markets (Malueg and Schwartz, 1994). Danzon et al. (2005) already shows that launch delays are correlated
with price regulation. However, Grossman and Lai (2008) also shows that parallel trade limits the ability
of poorer countries to free ride on innovation incentives created in richer countries, which benefits everyone
in the long run, even if free riding may benefit them in the short run. While free trade of goods remains a
principle of the European Economic Area, it seems regulators are starting to understand the potential harm
to exporting countries because of recent and possibly related drug shortages.18
The ability of regulators to trade off static and dynamic efficiency by responding optimally to the presence
of parallel trade and determining price regulation, hinges on the ability of each country’s regulator to fully
incorporate the effect of price ceilings on innovation and politically trade off price levels and innovation in
an optimal manner. Our results show that it may be important to also consider the structure and regulation
of pharmaceutical retailing, as intermediate retailers may manage to extract a large part of the reward to
18“The EU Commission acknowledges that parallel trade in medicines may be one of the reasons for the occurrence of
shortages of a number of medicinal products for human use.” Press release, May 2018.
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innovators. We leave for future research the study of optimal price regulation across countries when parallel
trade and strategic pharmacies interact with pharmaceutical industry manufacturers.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Pharmacy chains behavior proofs
When the pharmacy chain procures the drug from both direct and parallel imports, both margins m0ct and




































which shows that θ0ct has substitution effects within and across chains for both versions of the drug.
Developing the first order conditions using the effects of θ’s on the demand, we show below that it must
















sict(1− sict) ≤ 0,




































)− Vi0ct] (1− sict)sictdF (Vit) (7.1)
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because 1− si0t|c,B = si1t|c,B and 1− si0t|c = si1t|c.


















)− Vi1ct] (1− sict)sictdF (Vit|β) . (7.2)




























































Thus, equation (7.1) cannot be true if m1ct > m0ct, and equation (7.2) cannot be true if m1ct < m0ct.
In the case in which m1ct < m0ct, there is no interior solution for θ1ct, and thus we will have θ1ct = 0,
meaning that the pharmacy chain never proposes the drug with the lowest margin alone. Then, θ0ct is a
solution of equation (7.1). Thus if m1ct < m0ct then θ1ct = 0 and if m1ct > m0ct then θ0ct = 0. The intuitive
explanation is that when the chain increases the probability of only having the lower margin product available,
profits are hurt both due to the opportunity cost of consumers who would otherwise have bought the high
margin product when both were available and the loss of market share due to offering less variety on average.
7.2 Counterfactuals taking into account reaction in source countries
The bargaining surplus for the manufacturer with respect to another country I that is not a source country for
any chain c (I 6= I(c) for any c) is irrelevant for our concern, since prices in countries that are not exporting
to Norway should not be affected by the changes in the Norwegian market regulation, provided these other
countries do not export to source countries of Norway.19
19We do not explore the possible effects of changes in negotiation in other countries who do not export to Norway but who
export to countries that export to Norway. As our counterfactuals tend to reduce parallel trade, parallel trade from new countries
is unlikely. We thus assume that no country would start exporting to Norway if they are not already doing it.
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Method taking into account price reactions in source countries The bargaining surplus for the



















(w1c˜t∆I(c)s1c˜t + pI(c˜)1c˜t ∆I(c)s0c˜t)MN + (p
I(c)
1t − ct)qI(c)t(pI(c)1t ), (7.3)
with ∆Is1c˜t = s1c˜t − s1c˜t\I , ∆Is0c˜t = s0c˜t − s0c˜t\I , and I(c) is the source country of chain c, where s1c˜t\I
is the demand of direct imports in chain c˜ when there is no parallel imports from source country I, and
s0c˜t\I is the demand of parallel imports in chain c˜ when there is no parallel imports from source country I(c)
(implying that s0ct\I(c) = 0 and s0c˜t\I(c) = 0 if I(c) = I(c˜)), and MN is the market size of Norway.






where ∆WI(pI1t) is the welfare gain provided by the drug in country I and bI is the bargaining parameter of
the manufacturer with respect to country I (I(c) being the country I used as source of imports by chain c).
We allow the wholesale price pI1ct obtained by the manufacturer for a unit of drug sold in country I
and reexported to the chain c in Norway to be different from the wholesale price pI1t obtained by the
manufacturer for the domestic market of country I. If there is no intermediary and no transaction cost born
by the manufacturer, both prices should be the same, but can otherwise be different. While allowing this
flexibility, we impose that when the negotiated wholesale price pI1t in country I changes, the price paid by
the parallel trader pI0ct changes by the same amount. We thus assume both that
∂pI1ct
∂pI1t





which encompasses the case where we would impose pI1ct = pI1t and pI0ct = pI1t.




























and Πt − Π−I(c),t comes from (7.3). Using this first order condition, one can account for the equilibrium
change in wholesale price pI(c)1t in the source country I(c) in each counterfactual. We can also use this first
order condition to identify the marginal cost ct and bargaining parameter bI(c).
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In our application, we assess the effects of Norwegian counterfactual policies on the wholesale price in
France pI1t and thus on the relevant importing prices from France p
I(c)
1t , in addition to the effects in Norway.
We also account for equilibrium effects on prices of other statins in France, meaning that qIt(pI1t) and WI(pI1t)
depend implicitly on prices of all statins in France, denoted by the vector −→p It .
Demand model and price setting in France We estimate a random coefficient logit demand model à
la Berry et al. (1995) for the statin market in France, and use it to predict demand for and welfare gain from
atorvastatin in France. The details of the demand estimation together with the regulatory environment in
France are described in Appendix 8.10. We use the demand estimates to identify the welfare gain function
∆WI(pFR1t ) in the source country France for atorvastatin at price pFR1t as ∆WI(pI1t) ≡ ∆Wa(−→p It ) for a =
atorvastatin where −→p It is the price vector of all statins in the source country I (France). Given the demand
model, the welfare gain ∆Wa(−→p It ) is






















where MF is the French market size.
We then use the bargaining first order condition for atorvastatin (7.4) and the analogous conditions for
other statins to simulate the counterfactual price equilibrium in the French statin market as a whole. As
other statins are not exported to Norway, the first order conditions for other statins are simpler, and depend
on the Norwegian policy only through its effect on the price of atorvastatin (Lipitor).
As the results also depend on the bargaining parameter bFR of pharmaceutical companies with respect to
the French regulator, we first identify this bargaining parameter using the observed equilibrium prices and
the Nash bargaining first order condition for drugs that are not subject to parallel trade. Indeed, the Nash
bargaining necessary first order condition for any statin a that is on patent and not exported to Norway can
be written to express marginal cost as
cat=pat+
1
∂ ln qat(−→p It )
∂pat
+ 1−bFRbFR
∂ ln ∆aWFR(−→p It )
∂pat
(7.5)
for a 6= atorvastatin, where ∆aWFR is the welfare gain in France provided by statin a, qat(−→p It ) is the demand
of statin a, cat the marginal cost and −→p It = (pat)a=1,..,A the vector of all statin prices in source country I
(France). We show in Appendix 8.10 how we account for price setting of generics, which is not subject to
the same regulatory rule. We estimate the bargaining parameter bFR using a set of restrictions on marginal
costs, assuming that they are the sum of a molecule fixed effect, a strength fixed effect, a quarter fixed effect
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and a mean independent deviation. We obtain an bˆFR = 0.49, which is in the same range of values obtained
by Tuncel (2018) for other drug markets in France.
Then, we can use the bargaining first order conditions for all statins together with bargaining first order
conditions for parallel and direct imported atorvastatin with chains in Norway to find the new counterfactual
equilibrium.
7.3 Effects of parallel imports entry on margins and profits of pharmacist chains
Table 7.1: Reduced form evidence of parallel imports entry on pharmacist profits and margins
Dependent Variable ln qj0ctmj0ct+qj1ctmj1ctqj0ct+qj1ct ln(qj0ctmj0ct + qj1ctmj1ct)
(OLS) (OLS) (2SLS) (OLS) (OLS) (2SLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Presence PI of j in chain c at t -0.498 0.019 0.585 1.476 0.033 1.267
(0.025) (0.004) (0.215) (0.029) (0.015) (0.544)
Chain-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chain-year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Products fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 35,756 35,756 35,756 35,756 35,756 35,756
Notes: Product j is defined by ATC code level 5 (molecule)-strength. In the case of Two Stage Least Squares estimates (2SLS), the
variable “Presence of PI” is instrumented using the wholesale price in Czech rep., France, Poland, Spain, United Kingdom, as well
as exchange rates between NOK and euros, US dollars, GBP, Czech crown, Swiss franc interacted with pharmacy chain dummies.
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8 Supplementary Material for Online Publication Only
8.1 Graphic description of vertical chain
Figure 8.1: Vertical chain
8.2 Evidence on switching behavior across chains and drug versions
Table 8.1 shows the average transition probabilities by the combination of chain and PI versus DI. It shows
that there is much more switching across versions within a chain than switching across chains within a version.
This is computed thanks to individual purchases that the anonymous panel allows to follow over time.
Table 8.1: Transition Probabilities Across Chains and Drug Versions
Chain 1 Chain 2 Chain 3
Drug Version DI PI DI PI DI PI
Chain 1 DI 0.44 0.47 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03
PI 0.21 0.69 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03
Chain 2 DI 0.03 0.04 0.62 0.27 0.02 0.02
PI 0.02 0.06 0.34 0.54 0.02 0.03
Chain 3 DI 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.51 0.35
PI 0.02 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.64
Notes: Probability to switch to purchase drug version and chain in column given last period purchase of version and chain in row.
8.3 Prescription behavior and parallel trade
One worry for the identification of our model is that doctors will change their prescription behavior if
pharmacies induce consumers to consume parallel traded Lipitor more frequently. An example of what we
49
have in mind is that consumers might oppose getting parallel traded drugs, thereby making their doctor
prescribe them other types of statins for which there does not exist parallel traded alternatives. Over the
sample period, there was an increase in the share of statin prescriptions going to Simvastatin due to new
guidelines for statin prescriptions from the Norwegian Medicines Agency and a decrease in the share of statin
prescriptions going to atorvastatin (the molecule contained in Lipitor), as shown in Figure 8.2. We regard
this decrease as a function of the change in policy for statin prescriptions induced by the government, who
implemented a lower price cap on simvastatin than atorvastatin, and not necessarily related to the preferences
of consumers or doctors for directly imported versus parallel trade drugs.



















































We investigate the potential endogeneity issues arising from doctors responding to pharmacies strategies
for selling parallel traded Lipitor by changing what statin they prescribe. Using data on the prescription
behavior of individual doctors, we can look at the share of statin prescriptions going to atorvastatin, together
with the behavior of the pharmacies to which each doctor’s patients are exposed. This is feasible due to
availability of information linking the doctor to the prescription used by a patient for each transaction at each
given pharmacy. We use information about the availability of parallel imports (assuming that if a pharmacy
did not sell any parallel imports during a month, it means it was not available) and the ratio of margin
for parallel and direct imports at a given pharmacy chain. The availability gives a sense of whether the
doctor’s patient potentially faced foreclosure of direct imports, whereas the margin can be thought of as a
reduced-form measure of the pharmacy’s decision to foreclose direct imports. We calculate the weighted sum
of availability and margin ratio in each chain for each doctor, where the measure is weighted by the share of







where Ndt is the number of patients for doctor d in month t, and 1{parallelit} is an indicator for whether









where m0c(i)tm1c(i)t is the ratio of margins for parallel (0) and direct (1) imported Lipitor at the pharmacy chain
c(i) visited by patient i in month t. Overall, doctors prescribe Lipitor in 43% of the cases where a statin was
prescribed, whereas parallel trade is available for 25% of the patients. The number of unique doctors in our
sample is 14,051, who are observed for a maximum of 48 months between January 1, 2004 and December 31,
2007.
Table 8.2 presents the results of OLS regressions of atorvastatin’s share of statin prescriptions on weighted
margin ratios and parallel trade availability. The observation unit is a doctor-month. Column (1) shows a
large negative coefficient on margin and availability, although this is driven by the overall downward trend in
atorvastatin prescriptions, together with a tendency for both the margin ratio and the availability of parallel
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Table 8.2: Effects of margins and availability of parallel imports on atorvastatin prescription
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ratiodt ∗ availabledt -0.052 -0.000 0.003 -0.036 0.005 0.007
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ratiodt -0.018 -0.010 -0.013 -0.047 -0.022 -0.023
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Time trend Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes
Physician FE Yes Yes Yes
N 258,281 258,281 258,281 258,281 258,281 258,281
R2 0.01 0.11 0.13 0.02 0.18 0.20
Note: OLS regression. Standard errors clustered by doctor. The dependent variable is the share of atorvastatin prescribed by
physician.
trade to increase over time. This is confirmed by the coefficient on margin ratio going to a quite precisely
estimated zero in Columns (2) and (3), where we add a linear time trend and time-fixed effects, respectively.
When we add doctor-fixed effects together with a time trend or time-fixed effects in Columns (5) and (6),
we obtain a positive coefficient on the margin ratio and a negative coefficient on availability, both of which
are statistically significant. However, considering the size of the coefficients, none of them are economically
significant. The coefficient on the margin ratio tells us that the effect of an increase of roughly two standard
deviations (the standard deviation of that variable being 0.54), the atorvastatin share of statin prescriptions
will increase by roughly one half percentage point. Similarly for availability, an increase in availability from
none to full would yield a decrease in atorvastatin prescriptions by 2.2 percentage points. Considering that
the average availability is 25%, this result implies that very large changes in pharmacies behavior is related
to relatively small changes in the prescription behavior of doctors in our sample. We thus conclude that we
should not be concerned by a potential identification problem due to doctors changing molecule prescriptions
in response to pharmacies incentives to sell parallel traded Lipitor more frequently.
8.4 Details on derivatives of θ∗t (w0t,w1t)
In order to obtain how wholesale prices affect the equilibrium θ∗t (w0t,w1t), let Fθ,t denote the vector of
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Then, all the derivatives of market shares with respect to w1ct in equation (3.5) can be obtained from





























which shows that the change in a given market share, skct, caused by the change in a given wholesale price,
w1c˜t, will depend on the change in the full vector of θ’s following from the change in the Nash equilibrium in
the competition between chains.
8.5 Asymptotic Distribution of θct Estimates
In the case of interior solution to the Nash equilibrium in θct, θct must satisfy first order condition (3.2) given
other θc˜t. Let’s denote θuct (β) the solution to the first order condition whether it belongs to the [0,1] interval or
not. Then we know that the solution of the Nash equilibrium is θct (β) = θuct (β)1{θuct(β)∈(0,1)} + 1{θuct(β)≥1}.
Using the Delta method we can first find the asymptotic law of θuct (β). We need the gradient of θuct (β) with







































































































is the Jacobian matrix of θut (β) = (θu1t (β) , .., θuCt (β))
′ with respect to the vector of parameters
β, and var(βˆ) is the variance-covariance matrix of βˆ.
As θct (β) = θuct (β)1{θuct(β)∈(0,1)} + 1{θuct(β)≥1} we obtain directly the asymptotic law of θct (β) using










1{a∈(0,1)}+1{a≥1} which allows construct the confidence interval of θct (β).
8.6 Inner Loop Algorithm of Demand Estimation




pict s.t. 0 ≤ θct ≤ 1
Letting µLct and µHct denote the multipliers associated with the lower and upper bound on θct respectively,
the necessary conditions for maximization of the corresponding Lagrangian are
∂pict
∂θct
+ µLct − µHct = 0
µLct ≥ 0, µLctθct = 0, θct ≥ 0
µHct ≥ 0, µHct(1− θct) = 0, θct ≤ 1
The equilibrium in each period t is given by the solution to these equations for each chain c. This equilibrium











+ µLct − µHct = 0 ∀c ∈ {1, .., C},
0 ≤ θct ≤ 1, µLct ≥ 0, µHct ≥ 0 ∀c ∈ {1, .., C}.
The objective function in this minimization problem is the sum of the complementary slackness condition
corresponding to the bounds on θ for each chain, and will thus be zero at the solution, while the constraints
ensure that the solution is a Nash-equilibrium.
The full problem in the inner loop of the estimation also includes fitting the mean utility parameters αjct
for each product j at each chain c in each period t. These mean utility parameters are set such that observed
shares sˆjct are equal to predicted shares sjct(θt,αt,β), where θt is the vector of θct for all chains c, and αt
is the vector of mean utility parameters for all products in period t. We can write this restriction as
st(θt,αt,β) = sˆt,
where st(θt,αt,β) is the vector of predicted market shares from the model, and sˆt is the vector of ob-
served market shares. These conditions can then be included as constraints in the minimization problem
characterizing the market equilibrium in period t.
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+ µLt − µHt = 0,
0 5 θt 5 1, µLt = 0, µHt = 0.
Informally, we can think about the market share constraint as particularly informative about the mean
utility parameters αt, while the constraints corresponding to first order conditions for profit maximization
are particularly informative about θt, though in practice they will jointly inform all parameters. Note that
observed margins only enter each chain’s profit maximization problem (i.e., it does not have a direct effect
on demand), which serves as an exclusion restriction in our model.
The solution to this constrained minimization program is computed for each market t using a sequential
quadratic method.20 In our empirical estimates, we find a solution satisfying all constraints with the minimized
value equal to 0 for all markets. As further checks on the solutions of the inner loop, we perform several
additional tests (at the parameter vector estimated in the outer loop). One is a check of the second order
conditions of the firms’ maximization problems, to verify that the θ’s constitute a maximum. Another is a
check of whether a firm would profit by unilaterally deviating by setting θ to one of the corners (if θ is already
at a corner, only the other is tested), as a test of the Nash equilibrium. Also, we perform two tests for multiple
equilibria. First, we recalculate the solution to the system of equations given above for the cases where we
fix a firm’s θ at each of the corners (for each firm separately), thus removing the constraint corresponding to
this firm’s profit maximization problem. We then check whether any of the solutions satisfies the full set of
equations. Second, we solve the system of equations for many different starting values, checking whether we
obtain non-unique solutions.
8.7 Pharmacy retail pricing with price ceiling
Here we show that a pharmacy chain offering two goods, PI (j = 0) and DI (j = 1), subject to a common
price ceiling p¯ will sometimes choose to price both goods at the price ceiling, even if consumers have a
preference for one of the two. Let’s assume that consumers have a preference for DI, such that PI will be
bought to a lower extent if prices and availability are equal. It can be shown that the chosen prices will both
sometimes be at the price ceiling and that the extent of pharmaceutical coverage and “tightness” of the price
ceiling will make this even more likely.
Let the demand for each good j at pharmacy c be given by qjc(p0c, p1c, p0−c, p1−c), where pjc is the price
paid by the consumer for good j in pharmacy c. The price set by the firm, rjc is related to the price paid by
the consumer through pjc = τrjc, where 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1 is the co-payment rate. The profits of pharmacy chain c
is given by
pic = q0c(r0c − w0c) + q1c(r1c − w1c),
where wjc is the pharmacy chain’s wholesale price for good j. In a Nash equilibrium, given prices in other
chains, the pharmacy chain solves the problem:
max
r0c,r1c
pic s.t. r0c, r1c ≤ p¯,




(r0c − w0c) + τ ∂q1c
∂pjc
(r1c − w1c) ≥ 0, rjc ≤ p¯.
Assume that the price ceiling is sufficiently low to bind for good 1 (r1c = p¯), which is the one which
consumers value the most and will command the highest price in the absence of the price ceiling. To see
20See, e.g., (Judd, 1998, ch. 4.7). Specifically, we use sequential least squares programming (SLSQP), as implemented in the
optimization routines of the Python package SciPy.
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that the pharmacy could find it optimal to price at the ceiling also for the other product, note that the
unconstrained price for good 0 in this case would be








It is straightforward to see that r∗0c could exceed p¯ if the price ceiling is tight enough. From the second term,
we see that the lower the co-payment rate τ , the less responsive consumers are to any change in the retail
price p0c, thus increasing the optimal unconstrained price r∗0c. A lower price ceiling will tend to reduce r∗0c
through the reduced sales of 0, since the price of good 1 becomes lower, and through reducing the profit
margin on good 1, which lowers the value of the diverted sales to good 1 with an increase in the price of
good 0, but unless the price of good 0 responds too much to a change in the price of good 1 (i.e., the slope of
the “reaction function” is too large), it will be possible for both goods to be constrained by the price ceiling
simultaneously.
8.8 Outside option in the demand for atorvastatin in Norway
Concerning the importance of the outside option of not purchasing the drug, as we cannot observe if some
patients are prescribed atorvastatin but are not buying the drug. We thus investigate whether improved
access to pharmacies increases or not the purchases of the drug. In a country like Norway with large health
insurance coverage in the case of treatment for cholesterol control, we can expect that only a very small share
of the population in need is not taking the treatment. However, we evaluate the effect of improved access
which should affect the value of an outside option by measuring the changes in sales of atorvastatin in each
predefined area when one pharmacy enters the market. We regress the log sales in a given area on monthly
dummies relative to the date of entry of a pharmacy and find no significant effect of entry on sales, showing
that it is unlikely that the outside option of not purchasing a drug is very important. Graph 8.3 shows that
this change is very small and almost zero statistically and economically.
Figure 8.3: Effect of entry of a pharmacy outlet on sales in a given area
On the left panel, the top graph shows the log sales quantity in a given area before and after entry of
a pharmacy outlet with a 6 weeks window. The bottom graph of the left panel shows the same with a 10
weeks window. Vertical bars correspond to the standard deviation of log sales across areas at each week. On
the right panel, we have the same means and standard deviations estimates after removing market and time
fixed effects. We can see that the effect of entry on a 10 week window seem null and if slightly positive on a
6 week window, its magnitude is less than 1% of sales quantities.
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8.9 Details on counterfactual computations when foreclosure is banned























c˜ 6=c(w0c˜t − p
I(c˜)
0c˜t )∆0cs0c˜t,
∆1pict = (p¯t − w1ct)s1ct + (p¯t − w0ct)∆1cs0ct,
∆0pict = pict − pi−0,ct = (p¯t − w1ct)∆0cs1ct + (p¯t − w0ct)s0ct.
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8.10 Demand and Price Setting Model for Statins in France
We use quarterly data on sales volumes and values of statin drugs in France and the US from IMS Health
(now called IQVIA) for the years 2004 to 2007. The French data provide sales volumes and values for the
retail sector and hospital sector. We model the demand for the retail sector which is the one for which the
French regulation plays a role. We use the US retails sales to construct instrumental variables for prices in
France. Our random coefficient logit model for French statin demand assume that, for any product a, the
random utility for consumer i in France is
Uiat = βippat + βggat + βa + βt + ξat + εiat
where pat is the price of statin a at time t, βa is a molecule-strength fixed effect, gat is a dummy variable
indicating if the molecule of product a has lost patent exclusivity (changes over time), βt are quarter specific
fixed effects and ξat is an unobserved demand shock.
Specifying the random coefficient distribution of βip as normal N(βp, σ2p), and εiat as extreme value
distributed, we obtain the usual market shares
sat =
∫ exp(βippat + βggat + βa + βt + ξat)
1 +
∑






We estimate this model for the retail pharmaceutical market in France using the usual instrumental variables
methods. As excluded instruments, we use the retail prices of drugs in the US and the number of drugs in
the corresponding markets in the US. Table 8.3 show the estimation results and that heterogeneity in the
price coefficient matters and is precisely estimated.
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Table 8.3: Demand model for Statins in France
BLP
Coef. (Std Err.)
Patent loss of exclusivity dummy variable βg 0.0336 (0.2603)
Price βp -2.3291 (0.2346)
σp 1.2651 (0.4311)
Quarter fixed effects Yes
Molecule-strength fixed effects Yes
N 322
The demand model is estimated using the 20 mg, 40 mg and 80 mg markets. In France, there are two
molecules for the statin 80 mg market (atorvastatin and fluvastatin), four molecules for the 40 mg market
(atorvastatin, fluvastatin, pravavastatin, simvastatin) and five for 20 mg (includes rosuvastatin in addition).
Then, the first order bargaining equation (7.5) is used to recover marginal cost, but only for branded statins
as the prices of generics is fixed by regulation as a percentage of the branded version of the drug (Dubois and
Lasio, 2018). This percentage was 60% during the time period of our data, and descriptive statistics on prices
show that it was strictly implemented. For the counterfactual equilibrium prices of generics, we assume the
same regulatory rule still applies and therefore the prices of generics of a molecule will be set as 60% percent
of the bargained price of the branded product.
This implies that, in the equilibrium condition to be satisfied by the counterfactual prices, the semi-
elasticity of demand and semi-elasticity of welfare account for this constraint (dpg(a)tdpat = 0.6), i.e.,
∂ ln qat(−→p It )
∂pat











∂ ln ∆aWFR(−→p It )
∂pat











where g(a) denotes the generic version of drug a, and ∂ ln qat(
−→p It )
∂pg(a)t
denotes the cross price semi-elasticity of qat
with respect to the price of the generic version pg(a)t.
To identify the bargaining parameter in France, we minimize the residual sum of squares∑
a,t
(cat(b)− δa − δs − δt)2
with respect to b, δa, a molecule-fixed marginal cost term; δs, a strength-fixed term; and δt, a quarter-fixed









To find the new equilibrium for a counterfactual policy in Norway, we simultaneously solve the first order
conditions of other statins wholesale prices in France given by
pat = cat − 1∂ ln qat(−→p It )
∂pat
+ 1−bFRbFR
∂ ln ∆aWFR(−→p It )
∂pat
for all a except atorvastatin
where the right hand side of the equation has all statin prices in France as argument (−→p It ), including
atorvastatin (Lipitor).
8.11 Entry decisions of PI
We show indeed that when the wholesale prices in potential source countries decrease, there is entry of PI,
which makes sense as it is when the procurement price of PI is lower that it is more profitable to have PI in
Norway. We show this across all ATC5 therapeutic classification molecules-strength products for which there
is no generics yet but for which the same product exists in one of the source countries during some time in
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the 2004-2007 period for which we have the Norwegian data. We denote entry of parallel imports in market
t for ATC code j in any of the pharmacist chain in Norway as yjt = 1 if entry and yjt = 0 otherwise. We
estimate a logit model of entry as a function of the retail price
P (yjt = 1) =
exp(αj + pjtβ +
∑
s wjstβs)
1 + exp(αj + pjtβ +
∑
s wjstβs)
where pjt is the observed mean retail price across the three chains for product j, and wjst is the wholesale
price of product j in country s. We estimate the simple logit where αj = α is common across ATC codes and
also the fixed effect logit with unrestricted αj . The following table shows the results for the 298 products.
Column (2) shows the results with fixed effects on fewer observations because all markets for which there is
no variation over time or strength of parallel imports presence are dropped because of the ATC5 fixed effect.
The results show that the higher is the retail price in Norway of the product and the lower is the wholesale
price in source countries the more likely is the entry of parallel imports. The only positive effect of wholesale
price in France when not controlling for ATC5 fixed effect disappears in the second column with ATC5 fixed
effects.
Table 8.4: Probability of Market Entry of Parallel Import
Logit model (1) (2)
Retail price Norway 0.038 0.056
(0.003) (0.012)
Wholesale prices source countries (in NOK)












ATC5 Fixed Effects No Yes
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes
N 8,554 4,179
We also estimate the same logit model at the product-chain level, with the following entry probability of
parallel imports in chain c:
P (yjct = 1) =
exp(αj + αc + pjctβ +
∑
s wjstβs)
1 + exp(αj + αc + pjctβ +
∑
s wjstβs)
where pjct is the observed retail price in chain c for product j. The next table shows also that the higher is
the retail price of the product in Norway and the lower is the wholesale price in source countries the more
likely is the entry of parallel imports.
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Table 8.5: Probability of Market Chain Entry of Parallel Import
Logit model (1) (2)
Retail price Norway 0.019 0.029
(0.002) (0.004)
Wholesale prices source countries (in NOK)












ATC5 fixed effects No Yes
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes
Chain fixed effects Yes Yes
N 25,222 12,489
8.12 Effects of counterfactual policies on consumer welfare
Aggregation of consumer welfare across individuals relies on transforming the welfare changes in monetary
terms. As we don’t identify the price sensitivity of Norwegian consumers in the data, we can aggregate
individual changes only under the assumption that there is no heterogeneity of price sensitivity and we
cannot transform the changes in monetary terms. We however are able to provide distributions of individual
relative changes. Results on consumer welfare21 show that the share of consumers who would be better off
with a ban on parallel imports is of 39% on average across markets (dosage - month) with some variation
across markets such that the median across markets of the percentage of consumers who are better off is
34%. Thus, while banning one version of the product removes variety, a substantial portion of consumers
are better off on average because most consumers prefer direct imports to parallel imports. In the case of
banning foreclosure, effects are small and not reported.
8.13 General Bargaining Model
We show here that we can rewrite the bargaining stage model with both θ0ct and θ1ct meaning that we don’t
impose which drug will have a θ at a corner in the bargaining model (while we know which one will be zero
in equilibrium, which makes the model simpler to present as we do in the main part of the paper).
When the manufacturer bargains over wholesale price, if he proposes a low enough price to the pharmacy
chain, it may not be profitable for the parallel trader to enter and in that case the pharmacy chain has no
other supply channel. This changes the pharmacy chain profit function which cannot use parallel imports
as an alternative. At equilibrium we are never in the region of low enough manufacturer wholesale price
w1ct such that the parallel imports are not possible22. Thus, the Nash surplus of the pharmacy chain can be
written in the case where, at the margin, it remains possible to use parallel imports and the Nash surplus of
the manufacturer still needs to take into account the fact that the retailer can use parallel imports. We thus
21Our consumer welfare measure is based on expected utility that is E[uikct] =
∑
k,c
sikctVikct where sikct is the choice
probability of the appropriate case. In the current situation sikct is given by equation (4.1), in the case of a parallel trade ban,
it is given by equation (5.1), in the case of no foreclosure it is given by equation (5.3). Consumer welfare change is the change
of this expected utility between two situations.
22In fact this would bring much lower profit to the manufacturer as to prevent parallel trade it would have to sell in Norway
at almost lower price than any other source country price. Since other countries have low price (for example France can negotiate
lower price with the manufacturer because it has a large demand) it is more profitable to sell at higher price in Norway even if
it induces parallel trade.
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can write the Nash surplus of the manufacturer and the retailer as with both PI and DI (checking empirically
that the wholesale prices are high enough).
Then, which θ is at a corner will depend on the wholesale prices resulting from the bargaining game. We
show that the bargaining equations look similar, but the derivatives of demands with respect to wholesale
prices have more complicated expressions even if they boil down to the one we have in the paper when
wholesale prices of PI are lower than the ones of DI.
We denote by θ0ct and θ1ct the probabilities that the choice sets are {PI} or {DI}, respectively, and thus
1− θ0ct − θ1ct the probability that the choice set is B = {DI, PI}. The utility of consumer i is given by
uikct = Vikct + εict + λcikct
where Vikct is the mean utility consumer i obtains from choosing the drug of origin k in pharmacy chain c in
market t and εict and ikct are chain-specific and product-specific sequentially observed shocks, respectively.
The probability that consumer i chooses k ∈ {0, 1} conditional on choice of pharmacy chain c when both
products are available in the pharmacy is given by
sikt|c,B =
eVikct/λc
eVi0ct/λc + eVi1ct/λc =
1
1 + eVikct/λc−Vik′ct/λc with k
′ = 1− k
because ikct is i.i.d. extreme value distributed.
The choice probability of product k conditional on the choice of pharmacy c is then
sikt|c(θ0ct, θ1ct) = θkct + (1− θ0ct − θ1ct)sikt|c,B
that is, the probability of drug k being the only one available plus the probability that both are available
times the probability that drug k is chosen when both are available.
The shock ikct is observed after choosing a pharmacy chain and the consumer chooses a chain using the
expected utility of choosing a pharmacy by taking expectations with respect to the possible choice sets and


























which is always greater than max(Vi0ct, Vi1ct).













Denoting by F (.|β) the cumulative distribution function of consumer preferences Vit ≡ (Vi01t, .., Vi0Ct, Vi11t, .., Vi1Ct)
conditional on the parameter vector β, we can write the aggregate choice probability or market share of drug









sikct(θ0t , θ1t )dF (Vit|β) =
∫
sict(θ0t , θ1t )sikt|c(θ0ct, θ1ct)dF (Vit|β), (8.2)









sikt|cdF (Vit|β) = θkct +
(




Let us now turn to the behavior of the pharmacy chains. The profits of chain c normalized by market size
in time t are
pict =
∑
k∈{0,1} (pkct − wkct) skct,
where pkct is the retail price and wkct the wholesale price of drug k in pharmacy c at t. For almost all drugs
under patent (including the one used in the structural model estimation), the retail prices happen to always
be equal to the price ceiling (pkct = p¯t). We denote by mkct ≡ p¯t − wkct the product price-cost margin.
Appendix 7.1 of the paper shows that if m1ct < m0ct then θ1ct = 0 and if m1ct > m0ct then θ0ct = 0. We
reproduce this proof here before continuing the exposition of the general bargaining model.
When the pharmacy chain procures the drug from both direct and parallel imports, both margins m0ct




































which shows that θ0ct has substitution effects within and across chains for both versions of the drug.
Developing the first order conditions using the effects of θ’s on the demand, we show below that it must
















sict(1− sict) ≤ 0,




































)− Vi0ct] (1− sict)sictdF (Vit) (8.3)
because 1− si0t|c,B = si1t|c,B and 1− si0t|c = si1t|c.


















)− Vi1ct] (1− sict)sictdF (Vit|β) . (8.4)





























































Thus, equation (8.3) cannot be true if m1ct > m0ct, and equation (8.4) cannot be true if m1ct < m0ct.
In the case in which m1ct < m0ct, there is no interior solution for θ1ct, and thus we will have θ1ct = 0,
meaning that the pharmacy chain never proposes the drug with the lowest margin alone. Then, θ0ct is a
solution of equation (8.3). Thus if m1ct < m0ct then θ1ct = 0 and if m1ct > m0ct then θ0ct = 0.
These conditions lead to demands as sikct(θ0t , θ1t ).
Thus, there are two cases depending on which good is the high margin one. If parallel imports (good 0)
is the high-margin product for chain c, then θ1ct = 0, in the other case, θ0ct = 0. We can now simplify the





























and the individual choice probabilities are































where θ0t ≡ (θ00t, · · · , θ0Ct)′ and θ1t ≡ (θ10t, · · · , θ1Ct)′.









sikct(θ0t ,θ1t )dF (Vit|β).








≤ 0 if θkct = 0,
= 0 if 0 < θkct < 1,
≥ 0 if θkct = 1.
(8.5)






































if θ1∗ct (w0t,w1t) > 0⇔ w1ct ≤ w0ct
We now model the behavior of the manufacturer and parallel importer that bargain with pharmacy chains
over wholesale prices. Using the simpler notation θ0∗t , θ1∗t for θ0∗t (w0t, w1t), θ1∗t (w0t, w1t), the profits of the
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manufacturer are given by
Πt(w1t,θ0∗t ,θ1∗t ) =
∑
c
(w1ct − ct)s1ct(θ0∗t , θ1∗t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit to Manufacturer of Direct
Imports profit in chain c
+ (pI(c)1ct − ct)s0ct(θ0∗t , θ1∗t )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Profit to Manufacturer of Parallel Import
in chain c at wholesale source price pI1ct
,
where ct is the marginal cost of production, pI(c)1ct is the manufacturer price in the source country of the
parallel importer supplying chain c, and, as before, w1ct is the wholesale prices charged for direct imported
drugs to chain c at time t.
Each pairwise negotiation with the pharmacy chains, the manufacturer and pharmacy chain c set wholesale
prices to maximize the Nash-product
max
w1ct
(Πt −Π−c,t)b1c(pict − pi−1,ct)1−b1c , (8.7)
where b1c is the bargaining weight of the manufacturer when negotiating with chain c, Π−c,t is the manufac-
turer’s profit in absence of an agreement with pharmacy chain c, and pi−1,ct is likewise pharmacy chain c’s




Πt −Π−c,t + (1− b1c)
∂pict/∂w1ct
pict − pi−1,ct = 0. (8.8)
In maximizing the Nash product, there will be an effect on the manufacturer’s profit from how changes in
wholesale prices affect the equilibrium θ∗t (w0t, w1t) in the next stage of the game.
Denote the net value of agreement for the manufacturer and chain c as ∆cΠt ≡ Πt −Π−c,t and ∆1pict ≡
pict − pi−1,ct, respectively. The derivative of the manufacturer’s profit with respect to the wholesale price is















θ0∗t (w0t,w1t), θ1∗t (w0t,w1t)
)
∂w1ct
+ (pI(c˜)1c˜t − ct)
∂s0c˜t
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+ ∂s0c˜t∂w1ct ) = 0.
Similarly, the derivative of chain c’s profits with respect to the wholesale price w1ct is
∂pict
(









+ (p¯t − w1ct)
∂s1ct
(
θ0∗t (w0t,w1t), θ1∗t (w0t,w1t)
)
∂w1ct
+ (p¯t − w0ct)
∂s0ct
(
θ0∗t (w0t,w1t), θ1∗t (w0t,w1t)
)
∂w1ct
In the two expressions above, the derivatives of market shares with respect to wholesale prices depend on
the derivatives of market shares with respect to equilibrium θ′s and the derivatives of equilibrium θ′s with
respect to wholesale prices, which can be obtained using the optimal behavior of pharmacies, as detailed
below.
Using vector notations for market shares s0t = (s01t, .., s0Ct) and s1t = (s11t, .., s1Ct), we can then rewrite



















Letting sjc˜t\1c denote the share of chain c˜’s product j in t when direct imports are not available at chain




[(w1c˜t − ct)s1c˜t + (pI(c˜)1c˜t − ct)s0c˜t]−
∑
c˜





w1c˜t∆1cs1c˜t + pI(c˜)1c˜t ∆1cs0c˜t
)
,
because sjct\1c = 0, and defining ∆1csjc˜t ≡ sjc˜t− sjc˜t\1c, that is, the difference in share of product j in chain
c˜ between the case of agreement and disagreement in the negotiations between the manufacturer and chain c.
Similarly, the net value for the chain is
∆1pict = (p¯t − w1ct)s1ct + (p¯t − w0ct)∆1cs0ct,
Note that the derivatives of market shares with respect to wholesale price follow from the chain rule and
the implicit function theorem governing the change in equilibrium θ∗t when wholesale prices change due to
pharmacy chains’ optimal behavior.
Parallel Importers Behavior:




(w0ct − pI(c)0ct )s0ct(θ0∗t , θ1∗t ),
where w0ct is the wholesale price paid for parallel imported drugs by chain c at time t and pI(c)0ct is the price
that the importer has to pay for the drug in the source country, which we allow to vary across chains c for
full generality because each chain may require different source countries.
We assume that the parallel importer bargains over the wholesale price with each pharmacy chain c,
where they take as given the negotiated wholesale prices of originator products to each pharmacy chain
w1t = (w11t, w12t, · · · , w1Ct). When bargaining over the wholesale prices charged to the chains, w0t, the
parallel importer will also take into account how changes in these prices will affect the equilibrium θ0∗t (w0t, w1t),
θ1∗t (w0t, w1t). Similarly to equation (8.8), the first-order conditions for the solution to the Nash bargaining




+ (1− b0c) ∂pict/∂w0ct
pict − pi−0,ct = 0, (8.10)
which can be rewritten, following the previous approach using vector notations for prices and market shares

















where the left-hand side is the derivative of parallel importer profits with respect to the wholesale price w0ct
and we denoted ∆cΠPIt = ΠPIt −ΠPI−c,t with ΠPI−c,t =
∑
c˜6=c(w0c˜t − pI0c˜t)s0c˜t\0c and
∆0pict = pict − pi−0,ct = (p¯t − w1ct)∆0cs1ct + (p¯t − w0ct)s0ct
where as defined previously ∆0cs1ct corresponds to the market share of the direct imports at chain c when
there are no parallel trade version at chain c.
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